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The law [introducing a discharge of debt into French law] con-
tributed... to the renovation of traditional principles of contract
law in the name of the imperatives of social justice.'
We must resign ourselves to admitting that
"the right not to pay one's debts"...
is today definitively anchored in our legislation.2
The French word for "bankruptcy"-faillite-comes from the Latin
fallere, "to cheat, deceive, or trick."3 Because French law until recently
limited "bankruptcy" relief to merchants, a consumer's inability to pay
1. Anne Sinay-Cytermann, La riforme du surendettement: Les innovations de la loi
du 29juillet 1998 de lutte contre les exclusions, JCP 1999, I, 106, 36.
2. Nathalie C6te, Le nouveau dispositif de traitement du surendettement des par-
ticuliers: litre lIlde la loi no. 2003-710 du Jer aodt 2003, JCP 2003, I, 175, 1.
3. See DANIEL DESURVIRE, HISTOIRE DE LA BANQUEROUTE ET FAILLITE CONTEMPO-
RAINE 11 (1992); Y Pavec, France: Insolvency Proceedings, in EUROPEAN PRACTITIONER'S
HANDBOOK 85, 86 (Kenneth Cork & G.A. Weiss eds., 1984).
4. See, e.g., DESURVIRE, supra note 3, at 63-64; Didier Salavert & Richard Ortoli, The
Bankruptcy Laws of France, in EUROPEAN BANKRUPTCY LAWS 55, 61 (David A. Botwinik &
Kenneth W. Weinrib eds., 2d ed. 1986); J.H. DALHUISEN, DALHUISEN ON INTERNATIONAL
INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY §§ 2.02[4], 2.04, 3.01[1] (1983).
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her debts was generally called deconfiture 5-a word with a similarly un-
flattering etymology. It derives from the Latin decoquere, which means
literally "to diminish by boiling down," but also figuratively, "to squan-
der."'6 These judgmental words and their origins reflect the long-held
antagonism and disdain of most French policymakers and the public to-
ward consumers mired in debt.
But times change, and attitudes change along with them. In the late
1970s and 1980s, France was forced to reevaluate its prejudices, as the
"democratization" of credit 7 introduced scores of consumers to the joys
of "buying now, paying later."8 Unfortunately, this new privilege was
accompanied by a period of rising unemployment and inflation in a
European economy reeling from the Oil Crisis.
9 As a result, consumer
borrowing quickly became consumer over-indebtedness, which grew
into a social and political crisis that affected masses of ordinary, respect-
able people throughout Europe.0
On December 31, 1989, France became the second continental
European nation to enact legislation to deal with the rising problem of
financially overburdened consumers." Between December 1989 and Au-
gust 2003, the new law evolved through three significant amendments,
each of which offered increasingly substantial relief. The course of these
amendments in French law-especially the "law in action" that resulted
from and influenced the "law on the books'"
2-- offers tremendous oppor-
tunities for comparison with and reflection on the embattled U.S. system
of consumer bankruptcy relief.
5. See, e.g., PASCAL ANCEL, DROIT DES S(JRETtS 2-3 (2d. ed. 2000).
6. See DALHUISEN, supra note 4, § 3.02[l]; DESURVIRE, supra note 3, at 63-64;
Pavec, supra note 3, at 86. One more French word sounds deceptively like "bankruptcy," but
means something quite different: banqueroute. This word does not signify ordinary bank-
ruptcy (faillite or ddconfiture), but rather fraudulent evasion of legitimate debt, in some cases
even considered criminal. See, e.g., DESURVIRE, supra note 3, at 26, 38, 47-48, 51-52.
7. For a succinct description of the "democratization" of credit, see Frangoise Do-
mont-Naert, Legal Responses to Problems of Consumer Indebtedness in Europe, in
CONSUMER LAW IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 285, 290-91 (lain Ramsay ed., 1997).
8. See Luc Bihl, Le surendettement: apparition d'unflgau social, in LE SURENDETTE-
MENT DES PARTICULIERS 1, 4 (Michel Gardaz ed., 1997).
9. See, e.g., DANIELLE KHAYAT, LE SURENDETTEMENT DES MENAGES 6-7 (1999).
10. See, e.g., Nick Huls, American Influences on European Consumer Bankruptcy Law,
15 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 125, 126 (1992); Raphael Efrat, Global Trends in Personal Bank-
ruptcy, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 81, 92-94 (2002); Johanna Niemi-Kiesilainen, Collective or
Individual? Constructions of Debtors and Creditors in Consumer Bankruptcy, in CONSUMER
BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 41, 49 (Johanna Niemi-Kiesilainen, lain Ramsay &
William Whitford eds., 2003).
11. Law No. 89-1010 of Dec. 31, 1989, J.O., Jan. 2, 1990, p. 18, JCP 1990,111, 63451.
Denmark was the first, as it adopted consumer "bankruptcy" legislation in 1984. See Niemi-
Kiesilainen, supra note 10, at 42.
12. See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910).
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This Article on the French law continues a study of European con-
sumer debt-relief systems, which I began previously in an article on the
German system." With rapid legal and practical developments in con-
sumer debt-relief law, Europe provides an excellent comparative legal
laboratory for observing the potential benefits and pitfalls of consumer
bankruptcy reforms. In particular, French and German experiences with
long-term payment plans shed useful light on the great debate raging in
the United States over similar plans."
Like its predecessor, this Article seeks to achieve two goals as it de-
scribes the evolution of consumer debt-relief law in France: First, this
article analyzes a wide variety of legislative material and commentary on
the French consumer insolvency law that has been neither translated 5
nor substantially discussed in English.16 I hope that citations to easily
accessible Internet-based foreign sources and my English commentary
will deepen and broaden U.S. debate on consumer bankruptcy reform.
As French legislators took a keen interest in the operation of U.S. con-
sumer bankruptcy law," it is now our turn to learn from France's gradual
and carefully deliberated experiment with consumer debt relief.
More centrally, this Article describes the complex and unique ap-
proach taken by the French law. It explores the legislative history and
practical result of each stage of the process. Along the way, it briefly
compares the French procedure to those in the United States and Ger-
many. The French experience offers further challenges to both the
traditional "liberal" and "conservative" positions on consumer bank-
ruptcy reform in the United States. The economic results for debtors and
creditors under the French, German, and U.S. systems differ relatively
little, but the French and German systems emphasize an element of "re-
sponsibility" that the U.S. Congress seems intent on incorporating into
13. See Jason J. Kilbom, The Innovative German Approach to Consumer Debt Relief:
Revolutionary Changes in German Law, and Surprising Lessons for the United States, 24 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 257 (2004).
14. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 107-617, at 7-27 (2002); Charles Jordan Tabb, The Death
of Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States, 18 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 12-34 (2001); Kenneth N.
Klee, Restructuring Individual Debts, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 431, 436-38 (1997); Michelle J.
White, Why It Pays to File for Bankruptcy: A Critical Look at the Incentives Under U.S. Per-
sonal Bankruptcy Law and a Proposal for Change, 65 CHICAGO L. REV. 685, 710-16 (1998).
15. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations of French materials are the author's.
16. To be sure, several authors have made brief references to the earlier French laws,
see, e.g., JACOB S. ZIEGEL, COMPARATIVE CONSUMER INSOLVENCY REGIMES-A CANADIAN
PERSPECTIVE 140 (2003); Reifner, supra note t, at 148, Domont-Naert, supra note 7, at 287-
88, but this Article offers a more detailed discussion of the laws and their implementation,
including the latest round of reforms from August 2003.
17. The legislative record of the French law is peppered with references to the con-
sumer bankruptcy laws of the United States and other countries. For one particularly
comprehensive example, see SERVICE DES AFFAIRES EUROP9ENNES, LE TRAITEMENT DU
SURENDETTEMENT (1998), available at http://www.senat.fr/lc/1c37/ lc37_mono.html.
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U.S. law.18 Europe has viewed consumer bankruptcy from the perspective
of "responsibility" from the outset,'9 albeit in an arguably more balanced
and sensitive manner. The French and German experiences demonstrate
alternative methods of achieving the laudable goals of U.S. reformers-
indeed, perhaps more effective and comprehensive alternatives.
Part I traces the rise of consumer borrowing and the advent of con-
sumer "over-indebtedness" in France. It exposes the ill effects of
deregulation of the consumer credit market, as well as the shortcomings
of the pre-1990 system of legal protections for debtors. Part II analyzes
the multistage French system of consumer debt relief as it has developed
over nearly fifteen years. Comparing the French system with those in the
United States and Germany, Part II shows just how serious European
legislators are about demanding responsibility from debtors in attempt-
ing a fair compromise with creditors-and how they apparently
accomplish this goal. Finally, Part III reflects on several salient themes
of the development of the French system and the lessons they offer the
United States. Most importantly, while the French law requires sacrifice
and responsibility from debtors, it has not lost sight of the pivotal re-
sponsibility of lenders in creating a positive and profitable, but
sometimes dangerous, new world of consumer lending. This crucial
point seems to have been all but lost in discussions of U.S. consumer
bankruptcy policy.
I. THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF CREDIT IN A
CREDITOR-FRIENDLY LEGAL SYSTEM
A society in which consumers do not borrow to finance consumption
has no need for a legal system of consumer debt relief. While there was a
time when France used to host such a society, those days are all but for-
gotten. In a very short period in the early 1980s, consumer lending
accelerated from a trickle to a flood, transforming the credit market and
placing unforeseen stress on the legal system. Cries for legal relief from
an avalanche of debt soon reached the ears of French legislators.
This Part explores the economic and legal developments that formed
the impetus for adoption of the French consumer debt relief regime of
1989. Part I.A. describes the genesis of France's consumer-debt problem
18. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Past, Present, and Future of Bankruptcy Law in America,
101 MICH. L. REv. 2016, 2025-27 (2003) (suggesting that "Congress is animated by a new
political ideology of 'personal responsibility' that serves as a counterweight to the traditional
prodebtor ideology.... The personal responsibility ideology sees consumer bankruptcy pri-
marily as a moral issue, rather than an economic issue").
19. See Niemi-Kiesilinen, supra note 10 (contrasting the economic versus so-
cial/responsibility constructions of consumer bankruptcy policy in the U.S. and Europe).
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in a wave of credit deregulation in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Part
I.B. shows how the French legal system was caught unprepared for the
consequent surge of collection activity against delinquent consumers,
setting the stage for legislative reform.
A. Deregulation of Consumer Credit and
the Road to Over-indebtedness
Until recently, consumer over-indebtedness was a rare and largely
marginal problem in France, as credit was all but unavailable to consum-
ers. As one former bank employee described it, "[i]n 1965, to be a
[bank's] client was an honor to be earned."2° Those select few positioned
on the higher rungs of the social ladder could-and often did-borrow to
finance their well-to-do lifestyle.2' For the great mass of the populous,
though, banks viewed consumer lending "with the greatest distrust. 22
"Ordinary" borrowers were relegated to the services of cooperatives and
finance companies, 23 and their borrowing was a last resort to finance
shortfalls of resources to cover current expenses (rent, car repair) or ex-
traordinary outlays (medical and education expenses not covered by state
subsidies).24
French consumers began to use credit more widely after World War
II for larger purchases (primarily cars and furniture25), but even then,
consumer credit laws prevented most consumers from accessing credit.26
Consumer credit regulations limited the amount of consumer credit ex-
tended by requiring large down-payments for purchase-money loans
(20% to 30% of the purchase price) and limiting the length of time over
which payments on consumer loans could be spread (increasing the
monthly payments on those loans).27
20. Hervd Jaouen, Quelques transformations d'attitude et de pratiques chez les ban-
quiers de 1965 a 1995, in LE SURENDETTEMENT DES PARTICULIERS 213, 214 (Michel Gardaz
ed., 1997).
21. See Bih, supra note 8, at 2. One commentator suggests that, for example, a doctor
wishing to buy a boat might procure a bank loan, but not an "ordinary" consumer. See Jaouen,
supra note 20, at 216. For a fictional but realistic account of the borrowing habits of the 19th
century French "middle class" and the bankruptcy system they faced, see HONOR9
DE BALZAC, THE RISE AND FALL OF CESAR BIRROTEAU, available at http://
www.worldwideschool.org/library/books/it/romance/RiseandFallofCesarBirotteau/toc.html.
22. See Jaouen, supra note 20, at 215-16.
23. See, e.g., id.
24. See Bihl, supra note 8, at 2-3.
25. See JEAN-JACQUES HYEST & PAUL LORIDANT, SINAT FRANiAIS, RAPPORT
D'INFORMATION NO. 60, SURENDETTEMENT: PR19VENIR ET GU9RIR § I.B.1(b) (1997), available
at http://www.senat.fr/rap/r97-060/r97-060_toc.html.
26. See Bihl, supra note 8, at 3.
27. See id.; Marie-Th~rse Calais-Auloy, Le Crddit 6 la Consommation en France, in
VERBRAUCHERKREDIT UND VERBRAUCHERINSOLVENZ: PERSPEKTIVEN FUR DIE RECHTSPOLITIK
AUS EUROPA UND USA 102, 102-03 (Gunter Hbrmann ed., 1986); Dominique Schaffhauser,
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All of that changed when the French government followed the Euro-
pean trend of lifting credit controls between the late 1970s and the mid-
1980s,1 ushering in a consumer lending and borrowing free-for-all.29
Banks and other lending institutions began an advertising blitz, 0 compet-
ing fiercely to sell their various loan "products" to consumers. 3' To entice
consumer borrowers, French banks used various innovative and attrac-
tive forms of lending, particularly revolving credit in the form of credit
cards and lines of credit (dcouverts).3 2 The rate of annual growth in
lending to consumers rose from 6% in 1980, to 21% in 1985, to 39% in
1986."3 Between 1984 and 1988, consumer recourse to institutional lend-
ing rose 15 8 %.3 In 1985, a consumer law reform commission proposed
a re-imposition of 10% down-payments in order to avoid "rash pur-
chases," and to make buyers more "responsible."35 But it was too late for
Les Droits des Ddbiteurs, in VERBRAUCHERKREDIT UND VERBRAUCHERINSOLVENZ: PERSPEK-
TIVEN FUR DIE RECHTSPOLITIK AUS EUROPA UND USA 489, 489, 499 (Giinter H6rmann ed.,
1986).
28. See NURIA DIEz GUARDIA, EUROPEAN CREDIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, RESEARCH
REPORT No. 1, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 14-15, 18 (2000), available at
http://www.ecri.be/pubs/ECRlen.pdf. All credit controls (other than usury limits on interest
rates) were lifted between 1985 and 1987 in France. See Anne Morin, La loifran~aise relative
au surendettement: bilans et perspectives, in LES CONSOMMATEURS ET L'EUROPE DES SER-
VICES FINANCIERS 123, 126 (1992).
29. See Calais-Auloy, supra note 27, at 103; Jaouen, supra note 20, at 221-23; Franck
Marmoz, Surendettement et Droit Commun, 2001 REVUE DE LA RECHERCHE JURIDIQUE 1389,
1389; Morin, supra note 28, at 126-27; Gilles Paisant, La loi du 31 dicembre 1989 relative au
surendettement des minages, JCP 1990, I, 3457, 2.
30. See, e.g., Bihl, supra note 8, at 4; Jaouen, supra note 20, at 234-44.
31. See Morin, supra note 28, at 127; Jaouen, supra note 20, at 223, 225-27, 233-36,
238-44; HYEST & LORIDANT, supra note 25, § I.B.2.(b).
32. See Morin, supra note 28, at 127; Jaouen, supra note 20, at 234-35; HYEST &
LORIDANT, supra note 25, § I.C.2.(b); GUARDIA, supra note 28, at 23, 56 & tbl. A23 (noting a
rise in credit card use in France from 14% of total consumer debt in 1991 to 25% in 1993 and
thereafter-small compared to 44% in the United States, but still a significant number). The
number of people actually using credit cards remains quite small, however, around 7%, al-
though as many as half of all French consumers possess a credit card of some kind (mainly
department store cards). See FRANI OIS GUILLAUMAT-TAILLIET & CHRISTELLE ROINEAU,
INSTITUT NATIONAL DE LA STATISTIQUE ET DES ETUDES tCONOMIQUES, L'ENDETTEMENT DES
MENAGES: ENQUETE ACTIFS FINANCIERS 1992, at 10, 24, 99-101 (1998). A dicouvert is actu-
ally nothing more than an overdraft on a consumer's bank account, but French banks market
the equivalent of overdraft protection as a credit device similar to a line of credit, and meas-
ures of consumer debt include these overdrafts. See, e.g., Bihl, supra note 8, at 4; HYEST &
LORIDANT, supra note 25, § I.C.2.(b); GUILLAUMAT-TAILLIET & ROINEAU, supra note 32, at
8, 10; MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, FRENCH CONSUMER FINANCE: INDUSTRY OUTLOOK 9
(2000), available at http://www.ecri.be/pubs/issue 1/frcf.pdf.
33. See HYEST & LORIDANT, supra note 25, § I.B.2.(b).
34. See KHAYAT, supra note 9, at 7.
35. See Marie-Odile Mouriau, Les Actions Gouvernementales dans le Domaine du
Cridit t la Consommation et du Recouvrement de l'Impayg en France, in VER-
BRAUCHERKREDIT UND VERBRAUCHERINSOLVENZ: PERSPEKTIVEN FUR DIE RECHTSPOLITIK AUS
EUROPA UND USA 119, 120, 124 (Giinter Hormann ed., 1986).
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such proposals; Pandora's box had been thrown wide open, and the con-
sumer credit economy had taken on a life of its own.
Although French consumers remained moderately indebted relative
to consumers in Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States,36 the
consumer debt burden rose dramatically in France during the 1980s. In
1980, indebted French consumers on average carried a debt equal to
three months income, but by 1985, that number had grown to five
months, and six months by 1988."7 Non-housing consumer credit, as a
percentage of disposable income, grew 178% in France during the
1980s.35 By 1989, an estimated 200,000 French households carried a
debt burden with monthly payments exceeding 60% of their monthly
income.39 The French governmental program of encouraging new home
buying during a period of high interest rates in the early 1980s consti-
tuted one important cause of this heavy debt burden.40 Thanks in large
part to this increase in accession to housing, total outstanding consumer
debt rose from 12 billion francs in 1970 to 409 billion francs by 1995 41
Consumer credit growth leveled off in the 1990s and the 2000s, 42 but to-
tal outstanding consumer debt continues to rise in France (and
throughout Europe).4' Analysts expect this trend to continue.*
36. See, e.g., GUARDIA, supra note 28, at 7, 17-18, 20-21, tbls. A14-A18; DIDIER
DAVYDOFF ET AL., L'OBSERVATOIRE DE L'EPARGNE EUROPEENNE, COMITt CONSULTATIF DU
CONSEIL NATIONAL DU CRIDIT ET DU TITRE, L'ENDETTEMENT DES MENAGES EUROPEENS DE
1995 ;, 2002 1, 13, 22-23, 63-64 (2004), available at http:www.banquedefrance.fr/
banque -de france/fr/telechar/infobafi/rap-endette-menage.pdf. In 1995, for example, con-
sumers in France carried approximately one-half as much consumer debt and total debt
(including housing mortgage debt) as German consumers, and only one-third as much as U.S.
consumers. See HYEST & LORIDANT, supra note 25, § I.C. 1.
37. See Paisant, supra note 29, 2.
38. See GUARDIA, supra note 28, tbl. A18 (rising from 3.0% in 1980 to 8.3% in 1989
and 1990).
39. See Paisant, supra note 29, 2.
40. See HYEST & LORIDANT, supra note 25, §§ I.B.2(b), I.C.2(a). For example, from
1981 to 1985, over 750,000 French borrowers financed home purchases with "progressive-
rate" mortgage loans. See id. The interest rates on these loans during the first 5-9 years ranged
between approximately 9% and 13% (a relatively high rate already), but those rates jumped
later on in the loan (in the late 1980s) to as high as 14.7%. See id. To make matters worse,
many of these homes were subject to rapid depreciation, losing between 8% and 33% of their
value in five years. See id. Fortunately, many of these households (as many as 25%) were able
to refinance their mortgage loans at lower interest rates within the first ten years (to avoid the
spike in interest later on in the loan). See id.
41. See HYEST & LORIDANT, supra note 25, § I.C.2 (noting also that the percentage of
French consumers who own their home rose from 46.7% in 1975 to 54.4% in 1990).
42. See GUARDIA, supra note 28, at 19, tbls. A14, A18; HYEST & LORIDANT, supra note
25, § I.C.1; DAVYDOFF ET AL., supra note 36, at 1, 13-14, 37, 63-64.
43. See DAVYDOFF ET AL., supra note 36, at 63 (showing a rise in total consumer debt
in France between 1995 and 2002 from E437 million to E587 million).
44. See MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, supra note 32, at 5- 11.
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Most consumers managed this rise in indebtedness relatively well,
but many did not. Many consumers found the new world of interest rates
and monthly payment strange and confusing. Many borrowers did not
understand the significance of interest rates, repayment terms, or the to-
tal cost of the loans that they had undertaken.45 "Debt management
companies" emerged in the mid-1980s, taking advantage of consumers'
confusion regarding the legal and economic aspects of their debts.46
Many of these companies-like their U.S. counterparts 47-- offered ill-
founded advice that did more harm than good, and they were officially
outlawed in 1985.48 By 1989, the dockets of the small claims courts
(tribunaux d'instance)49 consisted primarily-75%--of collections cases
for non-payment of consumer debts.5'0
B. A Legal System Ill-Equipped to Deal
with Overburdened Consumers
Before 1990, the French legal system offered few sources of respite
or relief for the new wave of financially overextended consumers. Al-
though the word for consumer insolvency -- diconfiture- appeared in
several scattered Civil Code articles,5' the law provided no definition of
or collective remedy for consumer over-indebtedness. 52 Bankruptcy laws
45. See, e.g., Gilles Jacoud, La publicit6 diffusge par les itablissements de cridit: fac-
teur de surendettement ou facteur de privention?, in LE SURENDETTEMENT DES PARTICULIERS
265, 265 (Michel Gardaz ed., 1997) (noting that, according to a 1989 survey of consumer
borrowers, one French consumer borrower in three did not know the length of the repayment
period for her loan(s), and two-thirds had no idea of the interest rate on their loans). This con-
sumer confusion remained despite the "Scriveners" laws of 1978 and 1979 that required
lenders to disclose clearly the terms of their loans. See id. at 276.
46. See Morin, supra note 28, at 128; Mouriau, supra note 35, at 125-26.
47. See, e.g., PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMMITTEE ON Gov-
ERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE, PROFITEERING IN A NON-PROFIT INDUSTRY: ABUSIVE
PRACTICES IN CREDIT COUNSELING 1-23 (2004), available at http://govt-aff.senate.gov/
_files/032404psistaffreport-creditcounsel.pdf; CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA &
NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, CREDIT COUNSELING IN CRISIS: THE IMPACT ON CON-
SUMERS OF FUNDING CUTS, HIGHER FEES AND AGGRESSIVE NEW MARKET ENTRANTS 2, 31-
34 (2003), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulcJUCDC/cfa-nclcreport.pdf.
48. See Morin, supra note 28, at 128; Mouriau, supra note 35, at 127; Law No. 85-
1097 of Oct. 11, 1985, J.O., Oct. 15, 1985, p. 11982, JCP 1985, III, 57787, codified at C.
CONSOMM. art. L.321-1 (2004).
49. The tribunaux d' instance have jurisdiction over all personal and property cases,
including cases of property seizure and wage garnishment, where the amount in dispute is up
to C3800 (about $4500, see http://www.oanda.com for current and historical conversion rates).
See C. DE L'ORGANISATION JUDICIAIRE arts. R.321-1, R.321-4 (2004), available at http://
www.legifrance.com/WAspad/ListeCodes.
50. See Morin, supra note 28, at 126. One judge reported that, in her district of
Rambouillet, between 1976 and 1980, the amount in controversy in cases of asset seizure rose
from 90,000 F to 600,000 F. See Schaffhauser, supra note 27, at 489.
51. See C. CiV. arts. 1276, 1613, 1860, 1913, 2003, 2032 (2004).
52. See, e.g., Paisant, supra note 29, 6.
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existed in France in one form or another since 1673, 3 but those laws did
not apply to consumers.54 From the 1200s to the 1900s, French individu-
als could seek global refuge from the pursuits of their creditors only by
invoking the old Roman procedure of cessio bonorum (cession of all as-
sets),55 maintained in the Code Napoldon in article 1268.56 But the cessio
had no effect on the debtor's obligations or on creditor's efforts to seize
the debtor's property. In exchange for the debtor's relinquishment of all
his property for distribution to creditors, the cessio offered only release
of the debtor's person from prison.57 This procedure lost all practical
relevance with the abolition of imprisonment for ordinary debt in France
in 1867.
1. Short-Term Payment Deferrals
For the debtor's property, French law provided consumers only three
types of limited protection against the pursuits of individual creditors.
First, the Civil Code allows a court to grant a short-term delay or exten-
sion of time to pay an individual contractual debt.59 Introduced into the
Code in 1936,6° this provision offers "breathing room" to those who need
53. See DESURVIRE, supra note 3, at 33, 38-63.
54. See supra note 4.
55. For a history and general description of the cessio bonorum, see Jason J. Kilborn,
Mercy, Rehabilitation, and Quid Pro Quo: A Radical Reassessment of Individual Bankruptcy,
64 OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 870-72 (2003).
56. See, e.g., DESURVIRE, supra note 3, at 17, 32, 44. A particularly curious aspect of
French bankruptcy law is associated with the cessio: at least during the 16th-18th centuries,
debtors who had invoked the cessio were required to wear (or at least carry with them) a green
cap whenever they appeared in public. See Jean-Louis Thireau, Techniques et procedures de
dtsendettement dans l'ancien droitfran7ais, in LE SURENDETTEMENT DES PARTICULIERS 127,
149 (Michel Gardaz ed., 1997). The cap served both as a humiliating form of degradation and
punishment for the debtor, as well as a warning to those who might otherwise consider doing
business with the bankrupt. See id. The obligation to wear the bonnet vert was enforced less
strenuously throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, disappearing entirely in the early 1700s.
See id. at 150-51.
57. See, e.g., DESURVIR.E, supra note 3, at 44-45; Thireau, supra note 56, at 128, 132-
35, 140-41 (Michel Gardaz ed., 1997); Philippe Thdry, Le droit frangais de l'exicution, in
SEIZURE AND OVERINDEBTEDNESS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 261, 310 (Georges de Leval ed.,
1997).
58. See, e.g., Th6ry, supra note 57, at 310; JEAN VINCENT & JACQUES PREVAULT, VOLES
D'EXtCUTION 23 (17th ed. 1993). Indeed, the Civil Code articles on cession were abrogated
as of January 1, 1993. See Law No. 91-650 of July 9, 1991, J.O., July 14, 1991, p. 9228,
D.S.L. 1991, 317, art. 94.
59. See C. Clv. art. 1244-1 (2004).
60. See Law of Mar. 25, 1936, J.O., Mar. 26, 1936, D.P. IV 1936, 108; DESURVIRE,
supra note 3, at 52. Debtors could obtain similar relief since the Middle Ages by requesting
letters of respite from the court, delaying payment for 1-5 years. See, e.g., Thireau, supra note
56, at 130-32, 137-38, 142.
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a bit more time to gather their affairs and manage their obligations.6' The
relief offered by this law, however, is limited, both substantively and
procedurally. Substantively, the delay or extension may not exceed two62
years. Procedurally, the debtor must hail into court each individual
creditor with respect to whose debt the debtor requests a delay or exten-
sion. 63 These limitations render the law incapable of addressing more
serious cases of over-indebtedness. 64
2. Restrictions on Asset Seizure
Second, to ensure the debtor a "decent life,, 65 the law shields certain
types of consumer property from seizure by creditors. 66 Thus, no matter
how deeply indebted, French debtors can retain "all movable goods nec-
essary to the life and work of the debtor and his family. '67 An
administrative decree elaborates on this vague description by offering a
non-exclusive list of items that are clearly exempt from creditor collec-
tion efforts, such as clothing, bedding, household linen, food, cooking
utensils and equipment, certain furniture, a washing machine, books
used for study, children's toys, personal or family items of only senti-
mental value, domestic animals, and tools and instruments of the
debtor's trade or profession.6 ' But, not to seem overly generous with
what it giveth, the law immediately taketh away, noting that "items of
value," given their rare, antique, or "luxurious character," may be seized
by creditors. 69 Thus, not only may creditors seize "non-essentials," like
61. Although this law always applied to individual consumers, a 1978 law clarified that
consumers could seek such a delay or extension under what was then article 1244 of the Civil
Code. See Law No. 78-22 of Jan. 10, 1978, art. 8, J.O., Jan. 11, 1978, p. 299, JCP 1978, Inl,
46697.
62. See id. Originally, the law offered only a one-year delay or extension, but the period
was extended to two years in 1985, just as consumers began to feel the bite of over-
indebtedness. See Law No. 85-1097 of Oct. 11, 1985, art. 7, J.O., Oct. 15, 1985, p. 11982, JCP
1985, I, 57787.
63. See Morin, supra note 28, at 129.
64. See id.
65. See, e.g., Thdry, supra note 57, at 271.
66. See Law No. 91-650, supra note 58; Decree No. 92-755 of July 31, 1992, J.O.,
Aug. 5, 1992, p. 10530, D.S.L. 1992, 452, both of which may be accessed online by
entering the law numbers and dates available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/
RechercheSimpleLegi.jsp. The law of execution of judgments was amended substantially as of
January 1, 1993, see Law No. 91-650, supra note 58, art. 97, but the law applicable in the
1980s differed very little with respect to property exempt from seizure. See C. PR. CIV. [ANC.]
arts. 592-592-2 (2004).
67. Law No. 91-650, supra note 58, art. 14(4).
68. See Decree No. 92-755, supra note 66, art. 39. As for items not on this list, courts
and commentators have suggested that gas and electric ranges and refrigerators, for example,
are also protected. See VINCENT & PRgVAULT, supra note 58, at 75.
69. Law No. 91-650, supra note 58, art. 14(4).
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television sets, bookshelves, and rugs, 70 but also any "necessary" items
,, 71that seem overly valuable, such as new or "luxurious" cars.
3. Wage Exemptions
Finally, in "the most important disposition, without contest,"72 the
law restricts seizure of the debtor's present and future earnings from
work.73 Nonetheless, this protection, too, is somewhat limited. Because
the protected amount is revised annually based on fluctuations in the
consumer price index, 74 a review of current law provides a relatively rep-
resentative gauge of past and present French policy on wage garnishment
restrictions.
Creditors can seize an increasing amount of the debtor's earnings as
the debtor's take-home pay increases. Using rounded current figures and
a recent exchange rate,75 creditors can seize 5% of annual wages up to
$4325, then 10% of wages between $4325 and $8500, then higher per-
centages of several progressively higher tiers of income until the final
tier allows seizure of two-thirds of wages between $20,750 and
$25,400.76 For each child or parent in the debtor's care, the limits of each
of these ranges are increased by about $1600. 77 Creditors can deprive the
debtor of 100% of wages above these maximum protected amounts.78
Thus, childless debtors in one-income households today can keep a
maximum of about $18,625 if their annual income exceeds $25,400.79
Adding a child increases these limits to a $20,000 exemption for income
70. See VINCENT & PREVAULT, supra note 58, at 75.
71. See id. at 75-76.
72. See Thdry, supra note 57, at 273.
73. See Law No. 91-650, supra note 58, arts. 48-49; C. TRAV. arts. L.145-1-L.145-13,
R.145-1 to R.145-39. Note that, like Germany but unlike the United States, France allows
employees to assign their future wages contractually to creditors. See C. TRAV. art. R.145-40
to 145-44; GgRARD COUCHEZ, VOtES D'EXIICUTION 314 (3d ed. 1994). Cf 49 Fed. Reg.
7740, 7755-61 (1984) (outlawing most forms of future wage assignments in the United States
as unfair trade practices). Wages can be assigned only insofar as they may be seized; in other
words, the limits on coercive seizure of wages (garnishment) also limit voluntary assignment
of wages. See C. TRAV. art. L. 145-2.
74. See Th6ry, supra note 57, at 273.
75. These figures are based on the conversion rate on January 1, 2005, of $1.36/E. See
http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory.
76. See C. TRAV. art. R. 145-2 (2005). For 2005, the schedule of seizable earnings pro-
ceeds as follows: 5% of the first E3180; then 10% between E3180 and C6260; then 20%
between C6260 and C9380; then 25% between E9380 and E 12,450; then one-third between
C 12,450 and E 15,540; and finally two-thirds between E 15,540 and E 18,680.
77. See id. (for 2005, allowing an extra C 1190 per "person in the debtor's charge").
78. See id.
79. Applying the rising percentages of seizable income to each "tranche" up to E 18,680
produces C4981.83 (about $6775) of seizable income; therefore, about C 13,698 ($18,625) of
exempt income.
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of at least $27,000. o These exemptions are thus relatively generous, at
least for debtors with incomes near the top end of the exemption scale.
Indeed, if both spouses work, the exemptions apply to each person's in-
come, so these limits can be doubled if both spouses have good jobs. But
most consumers end up in financial distress precisely because their in-
comes are not near the top of these ranges, or one or both spouses do not
have good jobs.
In addition to this ceiling of protection, the French legislature in-
stalled a floor of protection in 1999 to aid those at the bottom of the
income scale." Prior to 1999, a portion of every franc of wages was
available to creditors. After 1999, 100% of the earnings of extremely
low-income consumers are exempt from seizure up to the so-called
revenu minimum d'insertion, or "RMI. '82 This "floor" rests very close to
the ground, however. The level of RMI for 2004 is C417.88 per month,
just over $6000 per year, and is increased by 50% if the debtor has a
spouse or domestic partner and by another 30% for each child in the
debtor's care. 83 In contrast, the poverty level for individuals under age
sixty-five in the United States in 2003 was just over $9500, about
$12,500 for two-person households, and almost $15,000 for three-
member households. 84
Although most consumer debtors in France and elsewhere possess
little if any hard property that can be seized, seizure of earnings "is a
procedure that produces, in general, good results" from the creditor's
perspective.' 5 With no effective means of legal relief from rapacious gar-
nishment of their earnings, some French debtors left their jobs and often
their homes, finding work in a neighboring city-until creditors discov-
ered where the debtor had gone, and the process repeated itself. 6 Some
80. Adding E 1190 for a child to all of the exempt income levels up to the increased
maximum of E 19,870 produces C5041.33 (about $6850) of seizable income; therefore, about
El4,828.67 (about $20,000) exempt.
81. See Law No. 98-657 of July 29, 1998, J.O., July 31, 1998, p. 11679, D.S.L. 1998,
303, arts. 87, 88. See infra note 232 and accompanying text for an explanation of the Feb. 1,
1999, effective date of this law.
82. See C. TRAV. art. L.145-2 (2004).
83. See Decree no. 2003-1282 of Dec. 26, 2003, J.O., Dec. 30, 2003, p. 22404, JCP
2004, 111, 20004; Decree No. 88-1111 of Dec. 12, 1988, J.O., Dec. 13, 1988, D.S.L. 1999, p. 2,
art. 1, available at http://www.legifrance.com/WAspad/RechercheSimpleLegi.jsp. For con-
sumers with more than $6000 of annual earnings, the normal rules still apply; i.e., 5% of the
first $3800 of their earnings, and 10% from $3800 to $7500 is still seizable. The "RMI-
minimum" rule applies only to consumers who would otherwise be left with less than $6000
total earnings after seizure.
84. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY 2003, available at http://www.census.gov/
hhes/poverty/threshld/thresh03.html.
85. See VINCENT & PR9VAULT, supra note 58, 171.
86. See id.
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debtors had reportedly changed jobs three and four times in this way.87
Alternatively, some of the most indebted French consumers chose simply
to "play dead," avoiding their creditors and sometimes even fading out of
public economic life entirely.8
II. THE BIRTH AND GROWTH OF THE FRENCH LAW
ON CONSUMER OVER-INDEBTEDNESS
This combination of skyrocketing indebtedness and inadequate legal
relief for overburdened debtors spurred the development of France's first
consumer bankruptcy law. This Part describes the new French system of
consumer debt relief and compares it generally with the corresponding
systems in the United States and Germany.89 Part II.A. provides two
points of reference with general descriptions of the U.S. and German
systems of consumer debt relief. Parts II.B. through II.D analyze the le-
gal provisions and practical application of the three levels of debt-relief
offered by the French law-(l) payment plan, (2) moratorium and partial
discharge, and (3) immediate bankruptcy proceedings and full discharge.
Finally, Part I.E. attempts to look to the future and predict where the
French system will go next.
A. Brief Overview of the U.S. and German
Systems of Consumer Debt Relief
The United States Bankruptcy Code90 extends to consumers the most
generous debt relief of any legal system in the world today.9' Most over-
burdened consumers seek relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
Code. Generally represented by a lawyer, the debtor files with the Bank-
ruptcy Court (a division of the U.S. District Court in each district) a
petition for relief and a detailed and complex description of her current
financial affairs and history. Within about forty days, the debtor is sum-
moned to a meeting of creditors, which is conducted by a "Chapter 7
trustee." The trustee is generally a local bankruptcy lawyer or accountant
appointed by the United States Trustee, a government agent who admin-
isters the bankruptcy system. Creditors rarely appear at this meeting, and
87. See id.
88. See Morin, supra note 28, at 129; HYEST & LORIDANT, supra note 25, at 2.
89. I have tried as best I could to address the questions in Professor Ziegel's insightful
model for comparative consumer bankruptcy analysis. See ZIEGEL, supra note 14, at 9.
90. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (2004). This description is based on my personal knowledge
and experience with the U.S. consumer bankruptcy system. For a good general academic dis-
cussion of this system, see MICHAEL J. HERBERT, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY (1995).
91. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65
AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 325 (1991).
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the trustee generally asks only a few questions to confirm that the case
file accurately describes the debtor's debts, assets, and income. In the
overwhelming majority of cases, the trustee concludes that the debtor
owns no property that may be seized, and the case is all but closed.
92 Ap-
proximately sixty days later (after the period for creditors to object to the
debtor's request for relief has expired), the court enters an order dis-
charging the debtor of liability on all of her pre-bankruptcy debts (other
than a few specific debts that are not subject to discharge). 93 The debtor
gets to keep all of her future income.
Alternatively, the debtor can choose to seek relief under Chapter 13
of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires the elaboration of a three- to
five-year plan of payments to creditors. The plan must dedicate to credi-
tors94 all of the debtor's "disposable income," which is vaguely defined
as that income "not reasonably necessary to be expended for the mainte-
nance or support" of the debtor, the debtor's dependents, or for the
debtor's business, if any9 The amounts that courts require such plans to
dedicate to creditors-and, consequently, the amounts left to the
debtor-vary widely from district to district, even within the same
state.96 In exchange for making all of the payments under this plan, the
debtor receives a discharge of all pre-bankruptcy obligations (again, ex-
cept those specifically excepted from discharge, which are fewer in a
Chapter 13 case than in Chapter 7). 97 Only about one-third of U.S. debt-
ors choose to seek relief subject to a Chapter 13 plan, and of those who
do, only about one-third successfully complete the plan and receive their
92. See, e.g., Robert D. Martin, A Riposte to Klee, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 453, 456 n.14
(citing unpublished 1997 official statistics showing that "no-asset" cases constituted 95% of
all Chapter 7 cases); Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy Under the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code: An Economic Analysis, 63 IND. L.J. 1, 38 (1988) (showing a return to unsecured credi-
tors in only 3% of liquidation cases in the late 1970s and early 1980s). If the debtor does own
property that can be seized and sold, the trustee does so and distributes the net proceeds to
creditors.
93. Such debts include, among others, alimony and support obligations, fines and pen-
alties owed to governmental units, drunk-driving tort claims, and student loans. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a) (2004).
94. Secured creditors and priority unsecured creditors must be paid the full value of
their claims, see 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a)(2), 1325(a)(5) (2004), but this level of detail is beyond
the scope of this brief overview.
95. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (2004).
96. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many
Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 532, 546-47, 550-51 (1993) (revealing that the Bank-
ruptcy Court in San Antonio, TX, requires Chapter 13 plans to offer 100% payment to
creditors, but in Austin, TX, only 25-33%, in Cincinnati, OH, 70%, but in Dayton, OH, only
10%).
97. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (2004).
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discharge.98 Overall, 1.4 million U.S. consumers filed for bankruptcy
relief in 2001, rising to 1.5 million in 2002, and 1.6 million in 2003.99
The German Insolvenzordnung also offers consumers two paths to
freedom from debt, but the debtor must attempt both paths, and both re-
quire a payment plan of some kind from the debtor.' A German
consumer bankruptcy case begins long before the court filing of any
documents or information on the debtor's financial situation. Instead,
German law requires the debtor first to attempt to negotiate with credi-
tors for an amicable resolution of her credit problems. The debtor must
be represented in this negotiation by a lawyer or state-sponsored debt
counselor, and the "case" begins in court only if the debtor's representa-
tive files an affidavit attesting that no amicable arrangement with
creditors could be established. About 30% of German consumer debtors
reach an out-of-court agreement with their creditors.,0'
The other 70% of German debtors proceed to file in court the same
sorts of documents and information as their U.S. counterparts. Like in
the United States, a court-appointed trustee sells any property subject to
seizure (which is present in only the most exceptional of cases), and the
case proceeds to its final stage. Rather than immediately freeing the
debtor from her obligations, though, the German system requires the
debtor to submit to a six-year period of deprivation, during which she
assigns all of her income subject to seizure to the trustee for distribution
to creditors. The debtor must make every effort to obtain and keep suit-
able employment during this period; if not, creditors can oppose the
debtor's request for relief. Since 2002, German law shields dramatically
more income from seizure, however,"2 to an extent that most debtors
have to cede little if any income during this six-year "good behavior pe-
riod." Non-business "insolvency" filings in Germany have risen from
98. See, e.g., Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Who
Uses Chapter 13?, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 269, 273, 274-75,
tbl. 1 (Johanna Niemi-Kiesilainen, lain Ramsay & William Whitford eds., 2003).
99. See ANNUAL U.S. NON-BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY FILINGS BY CHAPTER AND
JUDICIAL DISTRICT 2000-2003, at http://www.abiworld.org/ContentManagement/Content
Display.cfm?ContentID=3210 (reporting 1,452,030 non-business filings in 2001, 1,539,111 in
2002, and 1,625,208 in 2003).
100. Rather than citing individual German sources in support of this description, I refer
the reader to my description of the German system, which I believe is still the only detailed
analysis in English of the German law. See Kilborn, supra note 13, at 272-86; see also
ZIEGEL, supra note 16, at 140-43; Reifner, supra note t, at 150-51.
101. See Kilborn, supra note 13, at 275. 1 have found no statistics on the rate of success-
ful completion of such plans, and I suspect Germany, like France, does not produce such
statistics. See infra note 151-152 and accompanying text.
102. See id. at 285-86 (reporting that the wages of a childless couple are protected from
seizure 100% up to E 1289 per month-currently about $21,000 per year-and up to a maxi-
mum protected wage of g2066 per month--currently about $33,700).
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17,000 in 2001, '03 to 47,000 in 2002,'" to 61,000 in 2003. o5 This growth
trend is continuing, as non-business filings rose nearly 28% in the first
eleven months of 2004 over the same period in 2003'06
B. The French Law, Level One: The Commission,
Payment Plans, and the Courts
The French provisions on "Treatment of Situations of Over-
indebtedness,"' 0'7 located in the Consumer Code,' °8 establish a system that
draws on both the U.S. and the German approaches. In form and sub-
stance, the French system greatly resembles the German system. Both
emphasize a preliminary stage of out-of-court negotiation, and both rele-
gate the courts to a supporting role behind non-judicial negotiators. The
French system places much more power in the hands of a special out-of-
court negotiating "commission," however, and the rarely utilized final
phase offers relief in essentially the same way as U.S. law.
The first level of relief in the French system has remained relatively
stable .since its introduction in the original Loi Neiertz,'0 effective March
1, 1990.'"' Like the German model, the French law requires an initial,
out-of-court step of negotiation with creditors."' Indeed, consistent with
the European trend, the French law highly favors the amicable settlement
route." 2 Before the late 1990s, a negotiated payment plan was the only
103. See STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT, RUND 37 600 UNTERNEHMENSINSOLVENZEN IM
JAHR (2002), at http://www.destatis.de/presse/deutsch/sach/pml3.htm (reporting 17,048 fil-
ings by "other" than business debtors, and 46,849 "other" filings in 2002).
104. See id.
105. See STATISTISCHEs BUNDESAMT, UBER 100 000 INSOLVENZEN VON UNTERNEHMEN
UND PRIVATEN IM JAHR (2003), at http://www.destatis.de/presse/deutsch/pm2004/p 1280132.htm
(reporting 61,403 "other" than business debtors in 2003).
106. See STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT, KNAPP 10 800 INSOLVENZEN IM NOVEMBER
(2004), at http://www.destatis.de/presse/deutsch/pm2005/pO
4 90132.htm.
107. The drafters of this new law clearly sought to avoid the negative connotations of the
older terms discussed above in notes 3, 5, 6 and accompanying text (faillite and diconfiture)
through the rhetorical device of using a newly coined, neutral term, "overindebtedness"
(surendettement). See, e.g., DESURVIRE, supra note 3, at 167 n.295.
108. See C. CONSOMM. arts. L.330-1-L.333-8, R.331-1-R.333-5 (2004), available at
(as amended in August 2003) http://lexinter.net/Legislation7/traitement-dessituations-de-
surendettement.htm. The "L" articles reflect legislation, while the "R" articles set forth regula-
tory implementation of the law.
109. Law No. 89-1010 of Dec. 31, 1989, J.O., Jan. 2, 1990, p. 18, JCP 1990, H, 63451.
The law is called Loi Neiertz after the name of the then-Secretary of State for Consumer Af-
fairs, Vronique Neiertz, who spearheaded the introduction and passage of the law. See HYEST
& LORIDANT, supra note 25, § I.A.; Vatin, supra note 127, at 101.
110. See Law No. 89-1010, supra note 109, art. 32.
Ill. See C. CONSOMM. arts. L.331-1-L.331-6 (2004).
112. See, e.g., HYEST & LORIDANT, supra note 25, § I.A.l.(b); Morin, supra note 28, at
130; ASEMBL9E NATIONALE, Avis, Doc. No. 1001, at 7 (2003), available at http://
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available option for debt relief, and as this Part describes, the over-
whelming majority of cases today still conclude with a long-term
payment plan."3
1. The Commission
At the outset, the French system avoids the long administrative delays
of the German system'"4 by assigning gatekeeping responsibility "5 not to
understaffed debt counselors, but to 117' 6 official "commissions on
individual over-indebtedness," established in each "department""' in
France. The debtor may, but need not, be represented in lodging a request
for relief and, if the debtor so chooses, appearing before this
www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/pdf/rapports/rlO1.pdf; S9NAT, Avis, Doc. No. 405, at 141
(2003), available at http://www.senat.fr/rap/a2-405/aO2-4051 .pdf(last visited June 18, 2004).
113. See infra notes 150 and 215 and accompanying text.
114. On the months-long bottlenecks at the beginning of the process in Germany, see
Kilborn, supra note 13, at 274.
115. The debtor's "overindebtedness" and "good faith" are prerequisites for access to the
system, and the commission's first task is to verify that these conditions are present. See C.
CONSOMM. arts. L.330-1, L.331-2, L.331-3 (2004). "Overindebtedness" is defined in the very
first section of the law as "the manifest impossibility for the good faith debtor to meet the
totality of his or her nonprofessional debts that are now or will be exigible in the future." C.
CONSOMM. art. L.330-1 (2004). By and large, the commissions and courts have construed the
somewhat vague notions of "overindebtedness" and "good faith" relatively liberally. See, e.g.,
HYEST & LORIDANT, supra note 25, § I.A.2(a); JEAN CALAIs-AULOY, DROIT DE LA CONSOM-
MATION 417 (3d ed. 1992); Pascal Ancel, La pratique frangaise du redressementjudiciaire
civil, in LE SURENDETTEMENT DES PARTICULIERS 55, 62-63 (Michel Gardaz ed., 1997); Isa-
belle Couturier, La condition de bonne foi pour le rdglement des difficultds likes au
surendettement des particuliers, in LE SURENDETTEMENT DES PARTICULIERS 73, 77-82 (Mi-
chel Gardaz ed., 1997). Construction of both of these concepts, however, has been far from
uniform. See, e.g., Morin, supra note 28, at 131-32; KHAYAT, supra note 9, at 50-54; Gilles
Paisant, Le redressementjudiciaire civil i l'essai, JCP 1991, I, 3510, 9H 4, 16-32. In the early
years of the new law, some regions had a rejection rate as high as 82%. See DESURVIRE, supra
note 3, at 171 & n.307. The general average rate of rejection of petitions for lack of "overin-
debtedness" or "good faith" has fallen from about 10% to about 7% between 1990 and 2003.
See DIRECTION DU RESEAU, BANQUE DE FRANCE, SURENDETTEMENT: ENQU1TE TY-
POLOGIQUE annex 1 bis (2001), available at http://www.banque-france.fr/fr/telechar/
typologi.pdf [hereinafter, BANQUE DE FRANCE SURVEY]; ASSOCIATION FRAN AISE DES SO-
CItTES FINANCItRES, BANQUE DE FRANCE - INDICATEURS STATISTIQUES SUR LE TRAITEMENT
DU SURENDETTEMENT-MARS 2004 (May 4, 2004), available at http://www.asf-france.conm
COMM/optcomn/publications/Selcirculaires/selcircpdf/asf200446.pdf [hereinafter, AFSF
STATISTICS]. Approximately half of the rejections are due to lack of overindebtedness, and
another significant percent of cases are rejected for the presence of professional debts. See
ASSEMBLfE NATIONALE, REP. No. 856, § II.A (1998), available at http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/rapports/r0856-01.asp. A small portion of cases simply "fall by the wayside," as
debtors die, change address, or simply abandon their cases. See Ancel, supra, at 62.
116. This was the number of commission in 1997. See HYEST & LORIDANT, supra note
25, § H.A.2.
117. Mainland France is divided into 22 "regions," which are subdivided into 96 "de-
partments" (ddpartements), much like the United States is divided into states and counties. See
GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT FRANCE, at http://www.france-pub.com/efrance.htm.
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commission." 8 These commissions are not part of the judiciary, and no
judicial agency monitors the activities of the commissions. Instead, the
majority of the commissions' members concurrently hold positions in
the executive branch of government or bear responsibility for monetary
policy at the local or national level.
Six voting members and two "consultative" members comprise each
commission. The representative of the State in each department (the
prgfet) serves as the president of each commission."' The local treasurer-
general serves as vice-president, and the local director of fiscal services
rounds out the first, heavily "political" half of the commission's voting
membership.2 0 In addition, the president of the commission appoints two
more members based on the recommendations of (1) the French associa-
tion of credit establishments and investment enterprises (presumably the
"creditor" representative) and (2) local family and consumer associations
(presumably the "debtor" representative).'' An August 2003 law22 added
two more, purely consultative12 members to each commission: a social
worker and an attorney.' 2 The social worker's task is to advise the com-
mission on the optimum method to treat the debtor's personal and
familial situation and to develop a realistic payment plan to avoid future
credit disaster.' 25 The social worker is not expected to offer any "credit
counseling" or other advice to the debtor. Unlike most debtors in the
German system, the debtor in the French system thus receives little or no
counseling on budgeting, debt management, or any other matter. The
lawyer is expected to help in verifying the legality of creditors' claims
and ensuring that files ultimately transmitted to the courts conform to
legal norms.
126
118. See, e.g., CHANTAL MARTIN, L'INSTITUT NATIONAL DE CONSOMMATION, Vos DRO-
ITS: ENDETTEMENT ET SURENDETTEMENT, Fiche J212, at 3 (2004), available at http://
www.inc6.fr/bases/2-lesguides/j212-endettement_05-0
4 .pdf; C. CONSOMM. art. L.331-3
(2004).
119. See C. CONSOMM. art. L.331-1 (2004).
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See Law No. 2003-710 of Aug. 1, 2003, J.O., Aug. 2, 2003, p. 13281, D.S.L. 2003,
p. 1985.
123. See Crte, supra note 2, 11.
124. See Law No. 2003-710, supra note 122, art. 35(11).
125. See C. CONSOMM. art. L.331-2 (2004) (linking the determination of the debtor's
payment-plan budget with advice from the social worker); ASSEMBLtE NATIONALE, Avis,
Doc. No. 1001, supra note 112, at 28; StNAT, Avis, Doc. No. 404, at 57 (2003), available at
http://www.senat.fr/rap/a02-404/a02-40
4 1.pdf; see also HYEST & LORiDANT, supra note 25,
§ II.B.3 (first suggesting the addition of a social worker to help advise the commission).
126. See, e.g., StNAT, Avis, Doc. No. 404, supra note 125, at 54; ASEMBLtE NATION-
ALE, Avis, Doc. No. 1001, supra note 112, at 27.
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The final voting member, and the "workhorse"' 27 of each commis-
sion, is the representative in each department of the French central bank
-the Banque de France"'-who acts as the "secretary" of each commis-• 129
sion. As usual, the secretary really runs the show. In an intriguingly
unique approach,'30 the French law assigns to the central bank primary
responsibility for collecting the "declarations of over-indebtedness" and
financial information from debtors,' analyzing that information and de-
veloping recommended payment plans, negotiating those plans with
creditors and debtors, advising debtors on the course of their cases, and
advising the commission on how best to proceed with pending cases. 12
Neither the debtor nor any creditor may propose a plan, as that privilege
belongs exclusively to the secretary of the commission. The Banque de
France is thus the main public face of the commission, as well as the
main driver of policy and practice."'
Odd as it might seem to assign a bank to control a consumer debt-
relief commission, this creative solution turned out to be one of the most
127. See Jean-Luc Vatin, Traitement du surendettement: Nouvelles perspectives, in BUL-
LETIN DE LA BANQUE DE FRANCE 101, 101 (2d trim. 1996), available at http://
www.banquedefrance.fr/banque-de-france/fr/telechar/bulletin/etud30_9.pdf; cf HYEST &
LORIDANT, supra note 25, §§ I.A.2.(b), II.A.2 (calling the commission the "workhorse" of the
system, but noting the central guiding role of the Banque de France); Morin, supra note 28, at
133 (noting that practice had shown that the Banque de France was "the essential element" of
the commissions); KHAYAT, supra note 9, at 70 (noting that the Banque de France plays a
"role of the first order" in the functioning of the commissions).
128. The Banque de France is not a commercial bank and is not a creditor in these cases.
Its functions are largely regulatory and oversight, much like the activities of the system of
U.S. Federal Reserve banks. See, e.g., La Banque de France et le SEBC, La mission fonda-
mentale de la Banque de France est la mise en oeuvre de la politique monftaire unique dans le
cadre du SEBC, at http://www.banquedefrance.fr/fr/banque/main.htm.
129. See C. CONSOMM. art. L.331-1 (2004).
130. The French legislature was keenly aware of its unique approach in the scheme of
various administrative structures of consumer debt relief. See HYEST & LORIDANT, supra note
25, § I.B.2(c).
131. Consistent with the European "inquisitorial" system of justice, the Banque de
France on behalf of the commission has great power to collect information on the debtor from
a wide variety of sources. See C. CONSOMM. art. L.331-3 (2004).
132. See, e.g., KHAYAT, supra note 9, at 70, 75; Morin, supra note 28, at 133-34 (noting
that the Banque de France "effectuates virtually the totality of tasks" involved in preparing for
the commissions' deliberations); BANQUE DE FRANCE, SERVICES RENDUS , LA COLLECTIVITt:
LE SECRtTARIAT DES COMMISSIONS DE SURENDETTEMENT, at http://www.banquedefrance.fr/
banque.de-france/fr/info/collect/4.htm (describing the Banque's role as secretary); Circular of
Mar. 24, 1999, J.O., Apr. 13, 1999, p. 5424, JCP 1999, I1, 20076, § 3.1.1 (describing the vari-
ous and multiple responsibilities of the secretary of the commission), available at http://
www.legifrance.com/WAspad/UnTexteDeJorf?numjo=ECOT9914008C.
133. The economics ministry and other parts of the administration attempt to influence
policy in the commissions by issuing regulatory circulars to the presidents of the commis-
sions, see, e.g., infra notes 177-180 and accompanying text, but these circulars have no legally
binding force. See JEAN-Luc AUBERT, INTRODUCTION AU DROIT ET THEMES FONDAMENTAUX
DU DROIT CIVIL 174 (8th ed. 2000).
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effective elements of the new French system. The participation and sup-
port of the central bank was seen as critical to ensuring smooth operation
of the new law. The central bank's pivotal role lent crucial legitimacy to
the radical new law in the eyes of lending establishments. 3 4 The central
bank was all too happy to lend its support, as it sought ways to exert
greater oversight (and ultimately restraint) over the credit activities of
French commercial lenders.'35 The Banque de France was instrumental in
overcoming the initial reticence of many creditors toward the new sys-
tem. In the face of obstructionist attitudes from many institutional
creditors during the first few years of the new system, working groups
constituted by the Banque de France successfully lobbied their constitu-
ent credit organizations in support of the new law. This lobbying effort
produced a strong upsurge in creditor cooperation and a 150% increase
in the success rate of out-of-court plan negotiations between 1990 and
1993. 36
2. Payment Plans in Theory and Reality
The commissions' primary "mission '37 is to facilitate negotiated
plans between debtors and creditors. Once again, the Banque de
France-not the debtor or her lawyer--collects and analyzes all relevant
information, negotiates a plan with the debtor and creditors, and pro-
poses a resolution of each case to the commission. 38 The law offers
maximum flexibility at this stage. The plan may include measures such as
a deferral or extension of time to pay, a full or partial remission of debt,
reduction or elimination of accruing interest, or the creation or substitution
of a guarantee. 139 Any of these relief measures may be made contingent on
the debtor's accomplishing or abstaining from any act, such as selling cer-
tain property'4° or avoiding any further debt. 4' Originally, the commission
134. See KHAYAT, supra note 9, at 22-27, 30-31.
135. See Danielle Salomon, Quand une politiqe publique en cache une autre ... : La loi
Neiertz comme riponse politique et acte opportuniste des organes de tutelle, in LE SUREN-
DETTEMENT DES PARTICULIERS 13, 14-15, 21, 29-32 (Michel Gardaz ed., 1997).
136. See HYEST & LORIDANT, supra note 25, § I.A.l(b).Vatin, supra note 127, at 105,
Nick Huls, Towards a European Approach to Overindebtedness of Consumers, 16 J. CON-
SUMER POL'Y 215, 218 (1993) (linking the large number of agreed plans to the "moral power"
of the Banque de France).
137. See C. CONSOMM. art. L.331-6 (2004) ("The commission has as its mission to rec-
oncile the parties with a view toward elaborating a conventional payment plan approved by the
debtor and his or her principal creditors.").
138. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
139. See C. CONSOMM. art. L.331-6 (2004).
140. Property sales are a rare component of these out-of-court plans, most often involv-
ing real property or cars. See HYEST & LORIDANT, supra note 25, § II.B.l(a) (reporting home
sales in 5% of cases, car sales in 4%).
141. See C. CONSOMM. art. L.331-6 (2004).
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was supposed to accomplish this process of formulating and proposing a
plan within two months of the filing of the debtor's declaration, 4 2 but
that period was extended to six months in 2003 (due in part to the in-
creasing caseload of the commissions).
43
In theory, only the approval of the debtor's "principal" creditors is
required to support the plan.'44 In practice, though, the commissions ac-
knowledge failure if any one creditor refuses to sign on. 45 Nonetheless,
after an initially tepid reception by creditors, the out-of-court plan nego-
tiation stage of the process has shown a remarkable rate of success.
In 1990, the first year of the new law, creditors and debtors accepted
plans suggested by the Banque de France in only 45% of the cases ad-
ministered by the commissions.'4 That percentage rose to 58% in 1991
and 62% in 1992,47 thanks in large part to the concerted lobbying efforts
of the Banque de France. 48 Creditors and debtors were reconciled to
payment plans in over 60% of cases from 1992 to 1996,' 9 and approxi-
mately 70% of all administered cases since have concluded with an
agreed payment plan.5
Unfortunately, many of these plans were likely destined for failure.
Despite repeated pleas for statistical inquiry,"' no data exist on the rate
of ultimate successful completion of these out-of-court agreed plans.5 2
In fact, these incredible figures undoubtedly reflect, at least in part, pie-
in-the-sky plans signed by intimidated or uninformed debtors. A variety
of factors account for this gloomy outlook for many out-of-court plans,
but three reasons predominate.
142. See Law No. 89-1010, supra note 109, art. 9.
143. See C. CONSOMM. art. L.331-3 (2004).
144. See C. CONSOMM. art. L.331-6 (2004); KHAYAT, supra note 9, at 101.
145. See KHAYAT, supra note 9, at 101.
146. See BANQUE DE FRANCE SURVEY, supra note 115, annex 1 bis.
147. See id.
148. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
149. See BANQUE DE FRANCE SURVEY, supra note 115, at annex 1 bis (reporting 63%
agreed plans in 1993 and 1994, 66% in 1995, and 69% in 1996).
150. See id. (reporting 74% agreed plans in 1997, 75% in 1998 and 1999, and 70% in
2000); ASSOCIATION FRANI AISE DES SOCIET9S FINANCIERES, BANQUE DE FRANCE-
INDICATEURS STATISTIQUES SUR LE TRAITEMENT DU SURENDETTEMENT-DtCEMBRE 2004
(Jan. 6, 2005), available at http://www.asf-france.com/COMM/optcomi/publications/
Selcirculaires/selcircpdf/asf2005023.pdf [hereinafter, AFSF STATISTICS 2004] (reporting 69%
agreed plans in 2001, 2002, and 2003, and for 2004, reporting that agreed plans constituted
69% of those cases not referred for "personal recovery proceedings," but just 59% of all ad-
ministered cases).
151. See, e.g., HYEST & LORIDANT, supra note 25, §§ I.A.l(b), II.A.1, II.B.2(a), III.B.1;
Vatin, supra note 127, at 108.
152. See, e.g., Vatin, supra note 127, at 108 (explaining that this lack of follow-up is due
in part to a desire to avoid placing the beneficiaries of such plans in a situation of "tutelage,"
with Big Brother looking over their shoulders).
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a. Creditor Refusal to Agree to "Real" Relief
First, creditors generally resist the sort of "real" relief that many
debtors need. Creditors commonly agree to short deferrals of payment,
payment extensions, and interest rate reductions.'53 But although the out-
of-court plan may provide for remission of part or all of the debtor's ob-
ligations, creditors have consistently rejected this solution. 54 For
severely overburdened consumers, deferrals simply delay the inevitable
plan failure and re-filing for relief'
b. Overly Lengthy Plans
Second, these out-of-court plans extend over very long periods of
time. Most studies of the subject strongly suggest that payment plans
exceeding three to five years are destined to fail.5 6 U.S. law limits the
maximum duration of a Chapter 13 plan to five years, 5 7 and the German
system concludes with a six-year forced payment period.5 8 In France, in
contrast, most out-of-court plans extend over eight to ten years.59 In-
deed, some of the earliest plans extended as long as fifteen years.' 60 After
2003, all plans are limited to a ten year maximum by law, unless more
time is necessary to manage longer-term home mortgage loans in order
153. See, e.g., Morin, supra note 28, at 138; HYEST & LORIDANT, supra note 25,
§ Il.B.I(a), Il.C.2; Vatin, supra note 127, at 108; BANQUE DE FRANCE SURVEY, supra note
115, at 5-6.
154. See, e.g., HYEST & LORIDANT, supra note 25, §§ I.A.l(b), II.B.l(a) (citing a Na-
tional Consumer Institute figure of 10% of cases involving a modest agreed remission of
debt); Vatin, supra note 127, at 106; BANQUE DE FRANCE SURVEY, supra note 115, at 5 (not-
ing that, in a survey set in 2001, only 8.4% of cases involved an agreed remission of debt).
The results obtained in the first stage of the French "bankruptcy" system thus strongly resem-
ble the results of consumer credit counseling in the U.S. Credit counselors-both for-profit
and not-for-profit--often obtain payment extensions and reductions of interest rates, but credi-
tors seldom if ever agree to abandon any part of the principal debt or accrued interest. See,
e.g., Winton E. Williams, Consumer Credit Counseling Services: A Growing Private-Sector
Response to Counterproductive Collection Practices That May Lead to Bankruptcy, 7 J.
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 47, 51-53, 60-62 (1997); CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA & NA-
TIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, supra note 47, at 6, 21-22.
155. See infra notes 230-231 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Huls, supra note 136, at 228 (noting that debt counselors had identified
three years as the maximum period during which debtors were willing and able to submit to a
plan); Kilbom, supra note 13, at 283 (reporting the findings of German debt counseling cen-
ters); see also Morin, supra note 28, at 140 (noting the U.S. experience that plans should be no
longer than 5 years).
157. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (2004).
158. See supra Part I.A.
159. See, e.g., HYEST & LORIDANT, supra note 25, § H.B.2(a) (noting that the average
plan period by 1997 was 10 years); BANQUE DE FRANCE SURVEY, supra note 115, at 6, 23, tbl.
30 (reporting that, of plans concluded in early 2001, 29% extended over 5-8 years, and 31%
stretched beyond this).
160. See Morin, supra note 28, at 134.
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to avoid loss of a home. 6 But the notion that any commission can pre-
dict a debtor's finances a decade into the future, or that any consumer
can remain within a tight budget for ten lean years, is obviously ques-
tionable, at best.
c. Insufficient Reste-ii-Vivre Left to Debtors for Living Expenses
The third and most important factor undermining confidence in these
out-of-court plans is that these plans systematically impose unrealistic
payment demands that typically leave insufficient resources to cover the
debtors' reasonable living expenses. The most critical aspect of any
payment plan is establishing a delicate balance between how much of the
debtor's income to allocate to creditors and how much to retain in order
to support the debtor and her family. The commissions' record of
weighting this balance in favor of creditors has posed perhaps the most
significant problem in the French system.
In the early years of the new system, commission-proposed plans of-
ten left debtors only $2300162 per year for each individual in the debtors'
households. 63 Commissions generally used one of two methods to calcu-
late the so-called reste-l-vivre-the amount of income to be allocated to
the debtor's living expenses over the life of the plan: in one method, the
debtor's expenses for utilities, insurance, and other various on-going ex-
penses were covered; in the other, these expenses were not covered.'
64
According to one small-scale study, in 58.5% of plans signed in 1992
and 1993, the debtors were left to make do with between $180 and $360
per month.' 65 In a broader survey of plans established in early 2001, the
Banque de France discovered that the reste-a-vivre for the generous
commissions averaged only about $500 per month for single debtors,
$700 per month for childless couples, and $1000 per month for couples
with two children. 66 The less generous commissions allocated a tight
monthly budget of less than $300 per month for single debtors, less than
$500 per month for couples, and just over $800 per month for couples
161. See C. CONSOMM. art. L.331-6, L.331-7 (2004).
162. This figure results from application of an approximate average conversion rate for
French Francs to U.S. dollars in the early 1990s-$0.18/F. See http://www.oanda.com/convert/
fxhistory.
163. See Morin, supra note 28, at 134 (reporting that plans left to debtors only 35 F per
person per day).
164. See HYEST & LORIDANT, supra note 25, § II.B.l(a).
165. See HYEST & LORIDANT, supra note 25, § II.C.I (showing 2% of plans leaving less
than 1000 F per month to debtors, 58.5% leaving between 1000 F and 2000 F per month).
166. See StNAT, Avis, Doc. No. 473 (June 3, 1998), available at http://
www.senat.fr/rap/197-473197-473_mono.html#toc27 (reporting monthly averages of 2927 F,
4074 F, and 5960 F for singles, couples, and couples with two children).
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with two children. 67 In contrast, even the revenu minimum d'insertion
(the amount designed to avoid total exclusion of low-income consumers
from society' 68) for one person during this period averaged $400 per
month. 69 It is not clear how these commissions expected debtors to man-
age essential expenses given these hyper-frugal budgets.
Already in the early years of the new system, commentators began
observing that few debtors could be expected to complete a plan under
the extreme pressure of these "scandalously low" budgets.'7 ° According
to the only study on plan completion, conducted in May 1995 by the
Center for Savings Research, 10% of plans had already failed by mid-
1995. "' In a survey of debtors conducted by that same organization in
1994, 54% responded that they expected difficulties in abiding by the
terms of their plans. 72 Indeed, based on more analyses in the late 1990s,
the National Consumer Institute expressed its belief that three-quarters
of the plans then existing were not viable. 73 By March 1997, over 13%
of debtors had registered negative credit entries on their credit reports
after signing a payment plan,74 and by 1998, 30% of debtors had suf-
fered negative credit report entries within the first several years of their
plans.
75
Regulatory and legislative initiatives have increased the amounts left
to debtors under these plans, but they likely have not gone far enough.
Already in January 1993, the miserly practices of the commissions with
respect to the reste-a-vivre left to debtors attracted the concern of the
administration. In a regulatory circulaire76 distributed to commissions in
January 1993,' 77 the economics minister noted the problem of overly
stringent plans and urged commissions to avoid leaving debtors with less
167. See id. (reporting monthly averages of 1623 F, 2700 F, and 4638 F for the three
groups).
168. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
169. See Decree No. 91-1373 of Dec. 30, 1991, J.O., Dec. 31, 1991, p. 17419, D.S.L.
1992, 69 (setting RMI at 2184.79 F from 1/1/92 to 7/1/92, and 2224.11 F from 7/1/92 to
12/31/92); Decree No. 93-143 of Feb. 2, 1993, J.O., Feb. 4, 1993, p. 1891, D.S.L. 1993, 233
(setting RMI at 2253.02 F from 1/1/93 forward).
170. See, e.g., Morin, supra note 28, at 134; Sinay-Cytermann, supra note 1, 8.
171. See HYEST & LORIDANT, supra note 25, § II.A.1; ASSEMBLgE NATIONALE, REP. No.
856, supra, note 115, § I.A.
172. See HYEST & LORIDANT, supra note 25, § I.C. 1.
173. See ASEMBLgE NATIONALE, REP. No. 856, supra note 115, § II.A.
174. See HYEST & LORIDANT, supra note 25, § II.A.1.
175. See ASSEMBLfE NATIONALE, REP. No. 856, supra note 115, § II.A.
176. These regulatory circulars represent the administration's attempt to influence policy
in the commissions, but they have no binding legal force. See AUBERT, supra note 133, 174,
at 170.
177. Circular of Jan. 22, 1993, B.O.C.C., Feb. 13, 1993, p. 48, D.S.L. 1993, 277.
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than the revenu minimum d'insertion,' The economics ministry repeated
this entreaty to moderation in another circular in September 1995,"79 and
it increased the suggested minimum reste-ai-vivre to all earnings not sub-
ject to seizure. 80
The legislature took up this issue in 1998,8 ' and as of February 1,
1999, the commissions are required by law to leave to debtors all earn-
ings not subject to seizure.' Indeed, the law describes non-seizable
income only as a starting point for the amount to be left to debtors, iden-
tifying this as presumptively "one part of the resources necessary for
ongoing expenses."'83 Again, one of the explicit primary functions of the
social worker on the commission is to recommend an appropriate reste-
ai-vivre beyond this absolute minimum."'
The French system thus seems to have evolved toward a more de-
manding variant of the German system.' 5 Seventy percent of German
debtors reach the final stage of the process, 1 6 which requires debtors to
assign all of their seizable income to a trustee for six years. 187 Now,
French debtors whose cases conclude at the out-of-court plan stage (also,
coincidentally, 70% of all cases)' 8 are pressed into plans that similarly
require cession of all (or most) seizable income for eight to ten years.189
But although the French commissions seem to be leaving much more
income to debtors on average, the reste-a-vivre left to French debtors
still lags behind what German debtors are permitted to retain. The Ger-
man restrictions on seizure of earnings were vastly liberalized in 2002,
allowing married debtors to retain at least $21,000 per year, and as much
as $33,700 per year. '9 A review of French plans adopted in early 2001,
in contrast, showed that 65% of plans left between $700 and $1400 per
178. Id. § A.111. The administration also urged commissions to avoid depriving debtors
of goods "indispensable to the exercise of their profession (automobiles...)."Id.
179. Circular of Sept. 28, 1995, J.O., Dec. 13, 1995, p. 18111, D.S.L. 1996,2.
180. Id. § 3.2.1.
181. See Law No. 98-657, supra note 81, art. 87.
182. See C. CONSOMM. art. L.331-2 (2004). See supra Part I.B.3 for a discussion of the
current amounts of earnings not subject to seizure. This was not an uncontroversial point. The
Senate preferred to avoid the "de-responsible-ization" of low-income potential debtors in shield-
ing all or most of their income. See, e.g., StNAT, Avis, Doc. No. 473, supra note 166; S9NAT,
REP. No. 544 (1998), available at http://www.senat.fr/rap/97-544197-544.html#toc9O.
183. C. CONSOMM. art. L.331-2 (2004) (emphasis added).
184. See C. CONSOMM. art. L.331-2 (2004).
185. Indeed, the German model was chosen explicitly from among other major legisla-
tive approaches. See S9NAT, REP. No. 450 (1998), available at http://www.senat.fr/rap197-
45011/197-4501 Imono.html#toc260.
186. See supra Part I.A.
187. See id.
188. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
189. See supra Part II.B.2(b).
190. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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month to debtors ($8400 to $16,800 per year), and only 3% left more
than this.' 9' While these numbers exceed the absolute minimum neces-
sary to avoid exclusion from economic society, 192 one suspects that many
French consumers will be unable to resign themselves to life on this
poverty-level budget for as many as ten years.
3. The Limited Role of the Courts
In this first, most important level of relief, like in Germany, the
French courts simply provide backup for the commissions. Originally,
consumers could choose to initiate their "over-indebtedness" cases in
court rather than before the commission. 93 But just as they had come to
the aid of overburdened consumers, French lawmakers quickly had to
address a serious problem of overburdened courts.' 9' In the first few
years of the new system, the courts were "literally submerged by the
flood of over-indebtedness cases."' 95 The average delay for the estab-
lishment of a court-developed plan, in as many as a quarter of all cases,
quickly rose to 15.4 months.
9 6
Consequently, in 1995,'9 the legislature relegated the courts to a
supporting role, with the commissions acting as obligatory and exclusive
points of entry into the system. Today, in the vast majority of cases, the
courts fulfill only two limited functions: they resolve a small variety of
procedural disputes arising in the course of the commissions' work,99
191. See BANQUE DE FRANCE SURVEY, supra note 115, at 5, 22 & tbl. 29 (reporting that
65% of plans left debtors with between 5000 F and 10,000 F per month). These dollar figures
were arrived at using a conversion rate of $0.14/F, the average conversion rate during 2001.
See http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory. To be fair, although 8% of plans left the debtor
with only the meager RMI or less, and 24% left debtors with between RMI and about $700
per month, approximately this percentage of cases involved debtors with total income of less
than $700 per month. See id. at 13 & tbl. 9.
192. RMI for a two-person household in 2001 was about $550 per month. See Decree
No. 2000-1286 of Dec. 26, 2000, J.O., Dec. 29, 2000, p. 20817, JCP 2001, III, 20417 (setting
base RMI at 2608.5 F per month for 2001); C. CONSOMM. art. R.331-10-2 (2004) (increasing
the base RMI by 50% for a household). In contrast, the poverty level in the United States in
2001 for single-member households was just over $9000 per year, and just over $14,000 for
three-member households. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY 2001, available at http:/
www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/threshld/thresh01 .html.
193. See, e.g., Morin, supra note 28, at 132, 135.
194. See, e.g., ASSEMBLtE NATIONALE, Avis, Doc. No. 1001, supra note 112, at 7;
HYEST & LORIDANT, supra note 25, § I.A.l(b); ASEMBLgE NATIONALE, REP. No. 856, supra
note 115, § I.B.1.
195. KHAYAT, supra note 9, at 35-36.
196. See Vatin, supra note 127, at 109 (noting also that the courts were able to establish
plans in only 58% of cases submitted to them between 1990 and 1992).
197. See Law No. 95-125 of Feb. 8, 1995, J.O., Feb. 9, 1995, p. 2175, JCP 1995, InI,
67294.
198. See, e.g., C. CONSOMM. arts L.331-3 (2004) (disputes concerning the initiation of the
case based on the debtor's state of "overindebtedness" or "good faith"), L.331-4 (2004) (disputes
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and they confer legal force on recommendations made by the commis-
sions. '99
In the approximately 30%2" of cases in which the commissions can-
not themselves reconcile creditors to an out-of-court arrangement, the
commissions can make recommendations for a court-imposed plan.20 '
The Banque de France has suggested that the existence of the "stick" of
a court-imposed plan has increased the success rate of the out-of-court
stage, enhancing the willingness of creditors to accept the "carrot" of a
flexible, out-of-court negotiated plan. °2 The commissions can recom-
mend a court-imposed plan only at the debtor's request. 3 The law states
that the commissions "can" grant the debtor's request for a recom-
mended plan,204 but there appears to be little basis for a rejection of the
debtor's request, and the commissions apparently grant virtually every
request for recommending a plan.9 Once again, the commission (that is,
concerning the debtor's financial condition, particularly creditors' claims and their amounts),
L.332-2 (2004) (disputes concerning the measures recommended in the plan by the commis-
sion).
199. See KHAYAT, supra note 9, at 36-37; HYEST & LORIDANT, supra note 25,
§ I.A.2(b); Vatin, supra note 127, at 109-11; Gilles Paisant, La riforme de la procedure de
traitement des situations de surendettement par la loi no. 95-125 du 8fivrier 1995, JCP 1995,
I, 3844; NATHALIE SAUPHANOR, L'INFLUENCE DU DROIT DE LA CONSOMMATION SUR LE
SYSTEME JURIDIQUE V 469-83 (2000). Although the legislature rejected earlier proposals to
place final decision-making authority in the hands of the commissions, even the ultimately
less radical reallocation of power between the courts and commissions created a "marginaliza-
tion" of the role of the judge that has been heavily criticized on separation of powers grounds.
See, e.g., SAUPHANOR, id., [479; Paisant, id., In 4-5; Vatin, supra note 127, at 109-10; Anne
Morin, Surendettement des particuliers et des families: commentaire de la loifrangaise du 31
dicembre 1989, 1990 REVUE EUROP9ENNE DE DROIT DE LA CONSOMMATION 108, 116. One
commentator has suggested that this division of authority was based solely on the reticence of
the French legislature to fund the judiciary adequately enough to manage an increased
caseload of overindebtedness cases. See KHAYAT, supra note 9, at 121. This debate is intrigu-
ingly reminiscent of the debate in the United States in the 1980s concerning the role and
powers of the Article I Bankruptcy Courts. For a general discussion of this complex and fasci-
nating issue in U.S. bankruptcy history, see HERBERT, supra note 90, §§ 5.02-5.04.
200. See supra note 150 (noting the 70% "success" rate of out-of-court plans).
201. See C. CONSOMM. art. L.331-7 (2004).
202. See Vatin, supra note 127, at 113.
203. See C. CONSOMM. art. L.331-7 (2004).
204. See id.
205. Cf KHAYAT, supra note 9, at 115-16 (discussing the same language in art. L.331-
7-1).
206. See BANQUE DE FRANCE SURVEY, supra note 115, at annex 1 bis (showing a rate of
recommendation upon the debtor's request of nearly 93% between 1995 and 2000, with a
backlog of 5% of cases untreated); AFSF STATISTICS, supra note 115 (showing a more than
100% rate of recommendation from 2001 through March 2004, apparently in light of the small
backlog of untreated cases).
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the Banque de France) develops the proposed recommendation-not the
debtor.
27
The possible scope of relief in a court-imposed plan is more restricted
than in an out-of-court negotiated plan, however.0 8 A court-imposed plan
may not provide for the remission (discharge) of any obligation except in
one specific case:2°9 The court may provide for a partial or full discharge
only of a deficiency obligation remaining on a home mortgage loan fol-
lowing the forced sale of the home (that is, if the debtor still owed
$100,000 on her home, and a foreclosure sale of the home produced net
proceeds of only $80,000, the $20,000 "deficiency" for which the debtor
would otherwise remain liable could be discharged in part or in full).
210
Courts have rarely exercised this power, however.2 ' For all other debts, a
court-imposed plan is limited to offering an extension of the repayment
period212 or a reduction of accruing interest.213
Court-imposed plans offering these "ordinary '21 4 measures of relief
consistently constitute around 15% of all cases treated by the commis-
sions from 1995 through 2004.215 These recommendations are opposed
by either creditors or debtors in fewer than 10% of cases,216 and for those
207. In fact, debtors contest approximately 5% of the commissions' recommendations.
See AFSF STATISTICS, supra note 115 (reporting an average of about 1500 debtor-initiated
contests of about 35,000 recommended plans from 2001 through 2003).
208. The total length of a court-imposed plan originally could not exceed 5 years, but
this limitation was extended to eight years in 1999, and then to ten years in 2003, when agreed
out-of-court plans were subjected to the same limit. See, e.g., C6line Rondey, La riforme du
surendettement par la loi "Borloo " du ler aoat 2003, D. 2003, Doctrine, 2162.
209. See C. CONSOMM. art L.331-7 (2004).
210. See id.
211. See Salomon, supra note 135, at 36.
212. Before 1999, the commissions could recommend that the court impose a deferral
(that is, a period during which no payment is made on a debt), but after the 1998 amendments,
for individual debts, courts can only impose an extension of the total time to pay. See Law No.
98-657, supra note 81, art. 92; C. CONSOMM. art. L.331-7, 10 (2004). The commissions can
still recommend, and the courts can still enter, deferrals of payment, but such deferrals must
encompass all debts, not individual debts. See C. CONSOMM. art. L.331-7-1 (2004).
213. See id. The court plan may also call for the application of payments to the principal
of the debt, rather than to accrued interest and penalties, in order to reduce the amount on
which interest will continue to accrue. See id.
214. See infra Part I.C. for a discussion of "extraordinary" court plans and powers,
applicable in exceptional cases.
215. See BANQUE DE FRANCE SURVEY, supra note 115, at annex 1 bis (reporting about
11,000 confirmed plans out of a total of between about 60,000 and 90,000 administered cases
annually from 1996 to 1999, and 17,170 confirmed "ordinary" plans out of 117,240 total ad-
ministered cases in 2000); AFSF STATISTICS 2004, supra note 150 (reporting between 20,544
and 23,103 "ordinary" recommendations per year from 2001 through 2004 of a total of be-
tween 117,000 and 159,000 cases administered in those years, including referrals in 2004 to
"personal recovery proceedings").
216. See AFSF STATISTICS, supra note 115 (reporting challenges to only 10% of com-
mission recommendations from 2001 through 2003, with "ordinary" recommendations
constituting about two-thirds of total recommendations).
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that are not opposed within fifteen days,17 the court simply enters an or-
der confirming the recommended plan, giving it the force of law. 2 s The
court holds no hearing, does not solicit a vote from creditors, and dis-
poses of most cases with a simple order.
Thus, with or without minor court involvement, this first "payment
plan" stage of the process disposes of at least 75% of all French con-
sumer over-indebtedness cases. The relief granted at this stage generally
amounts to no more than a simple extension of time to pay or a reduction
in accruing interest. If it seems surprising to a U.S. observer that these
minor measures can offer effective relief to the vast majority of French
consumers, let us not forget that the French are far less overwhelmed by
debt than their German or U.S. counterparts," 9 and the Banque de
France's statistics do not report on successfully completed plans.
Whether this first level of relief in the French process is "effective" or
not remains to be seen. The prognosis for most plans is dim, however,
and the French legislature has already had to return to the drafting table
twice in the last six years to offer comprehensive relief to those truly in
need, as the next two Parts will reveal.
C. Level Two, "Extraordinary" Recommendations: Global Payment
Moratorium and Partial Discharge of Debt
After only a few years of practice under the new law, the commis-
sions and courts discovered an increasing number of cases for which the
law simply did not empower them to offer effective relief. A severe eco-
nomic depression rocked Europe in the early 1990s, putting many
consumers out of work22° just as their debt levels reached new heights
after the credit revolution of the late 1980s.2 2 1 For others, divorce or ill-
ness left them unable to manage heightened debt levels incurred at an
earlier stage in life, when the outlook for the future was brighter.2 2 Most
217. See C. CONSOMM. art L.332-2 (2004).
218. See C. CONSOMM. art L.332-1 (2004).
219. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., Niemi-Kiesilainen, supra note 10, at 49.
221. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
222. Unemployment, divorce or separation, and illness are constantly cited as the pri-
mary "causes" (perhaps more accurately, "triggers") of overindebtedness. See, e.g., Xavier
Lagarde, Privenir le surendettement des particuliers, JCP 2002, I, 163, 2 (citing unemploy-
ment, divorce/separation, and illness as causing 51 % of all cases of overindebtedness); HYEST
& LORIDANT, supra note 25, § I.B.2(a) (citing figures on the "causes" of overindebtedness
between 1994 and 1996, with unemployment, illness, and divorce/separation accounting for
60% or more of cases in each year); ASSEMBLI E NATIONALE, REP. No. 856, supra note 115,
§ II.B (citing studies reporting over 40% of cases attributable to unemployment, and around
15% attributable to each of illness and separation); ASEMBLgE NATIONALE, REP. No. 1062, at
67 (1998), available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.frlegislatures/l 1/pdf/rap-info/
i 1062.pdf.
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creditors adamantly refused to give up any portion of their debts,
223 and
even ten-year payment deferrals and reductions of interest rates to zero
could not put many consumers back on track to paying 100% of their
debts.
1. "Ordinary" Measures Increasingly Proved Insufficient
More and more consumers demonstrated a marked inability to repay
their accumulated debt in full, and many could pay nothing whatsoever.
One 1995 national study suggested that 28% of debtors could barely
cover reasonable living expense, let alone pay anything on their debts,
and only 25% of debtors clearly had the capacity to repay any significant
portion of their debts after covering reasonable living expenses.
224
Smaller studies at the dpartment
2 25 level reported similar findings.
2 2 6
Even the Banque de France ultimately recognized simple insufficiency
of resources as one of the most important causes of failure of the negoti-
227ated-plan stage.
Because lack of resources was not a proper basis for dismissal of a
case,22 8 the commissions and courts had to manage as best they could
with the tools they were given. A trend soon developed in which the
commissions and courts would hammer out a "payment plan" imposing
a multi-year229 deferral of all payments, with full expectation that the
debtor would be back with a repeat filing for relief upon the expiration
of the deferral period.20 Estimates of the extent of this "repeat filing"
223. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
224. See HYEST & LORIDANT, supra note 25, § I.B. l(a) (reporting the findings of a 1995
study by the Center for Research on Savings). The study reported "gross repayment capacity"
of a small subset of debtors, calculated by subtracting fixed expenses from monthly income.
See id. at n.7. It thus did not subtract any amount to allow debtors to cover ongoing variable
expenses for food, clothing, maintenance, education, etc.-the so-called "reste-ai-vivre." See
id. at n.7. I have subtracted the most common "reste-it-vivre" amount left to debtors as re-
ported in the 2001 Banque de France survey: 5000 F-10,000 F per month. See supra note 191.
225. Ddpartments are the equivalent of U.S. counties. See supra note 117.
226. See HYEST & LORIDANT, supra note 25, § II.C. 1 (describing the findings of a 1995
study in the Loire department, reporting negative payment capacity for 32% of debtors, and
ability to pay more than 500 F per month-about $75-in only 27% of cases).
227. See Vatin, supra note 127, at 108.
228. Early on, some courts held otherwise and simply dismissed cases of debtors without
sufficient resources to form the basis for a successful payment plan. See Ancel, supra note
115, at 64-65. These courts left debtors to the pursuits of their creditors, which the courts
assumed would be fruitless, given the lack of seizable assets and income of these debtors. See
id. The French high court, the Cour de cassation, firmly rejected this approach and required
the courts to do what they could with these "terminal" cases. See Cass. Ire civ., Jan. 27, 1993,
Bull. civ. I, no. 41, D. 1993, Jur. p. 343, note Jean-Pierre Bonthoux.
229. Before 1999, the maximum length of an in-court plan imposing such a deferral was
5 years. See Law No. 89-1010, supra note 109, art. 12.
230. See, e.g., HYEST & LORIDANT, supra note 25, §§ U.C.2, IfI.B.5; S9NAT, Avis,
Doc. No. 478, Ch. 2, § II.A (June 4, 1998), available at http://www.senat.fr/rap/197-478/
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trend ranged between 15% and 18% of all cases. 3' These debtors needed
fundamental relief in the form of discharge of at least some of their
debts.
2. Legislative Response: A Higher Level of Relief
In 1998, the legislature responde'd with a hesitant half-step toward
discharge of unpaid debt. Since February 1, 1999,232 if creditors refuse a
negotiated plan, the commissions can recommend-and the courts can
impose-"extraordinary ' '21 measures, more powerful than the "ordinary"
measures of simple payment deferrals and reductions of interest rates.
If the commission establishes that the debtor is "insolvent," as de-
fined in the law (see below), it may recommend that the court impose a
global deferral of all of the debtor's debts for up to two years.23 5 This
period is designed to allow the debtor's financial situation to stabilize.236
At the conclusion of this period, the commission reexamines the debtor's
financial situation.237 If the debtor's situation has improved, and she is no
longer "insolvent," then the commission must238 recommend a payment
plan239 including some or all of the "ordinary" measures discussed
above240 (up to ten years of payment extensions and interest rate reduc-
tions).24' If the debtor remains insolvent at the expiration of this period,
197-47813.html; Sinay-Cytermann, supra note 1, T 11; ASSEMBLtE NATIONALE, Avis, Doc.
No. 1001, supra note 112, at 8.
231. See HYEST & LORIDANT, supra note 25, § II.C.2.
232. This is the date on which the 1998 amendments became effective. See Law No. 98-
657, supra note 81, art. 99; Decree No. 99-65 of Feb. 1, 1999, J.O., Feb. 2, 1999, JCP 1999,
I, 20038 (the publication of which fixed the entry into force of the amendments).
233. "Extraordinary" and "ordinary" are terms of art used in practice to distinguish rec-
ommendations made under article L.331-7 from those made under article L.331-7-1. See,
e.g., Nathalie C6te, Le nouveau dispositif de traitement du surendettement des particuliers:
itre MIde la loi no. 2003-710du ler aoCt 2003, JCP2003, I, 175, [ 21-22.
234. The word here again is "may" (peut)-not shall, although there seems to be no
basis for the commission's refusal to recommend a global suspension if the debtor is, in fact,
insolvent. See KHAYAT, supra note 9, at 115-16.
235. See C. CONSOMM. art. L.331-7-1 (2004). This period was three years before 2003.
See C. CONSOMM. art. L.331-7-1 (1999). Note that, under the law after 1999, the commissions
cannot recommend, and the courts cannot impose, deferrals of individual debts. See C. CON-
SOMM. art. L.331-7, 10(2004).
236. See, e.g., Sinay-Cytermann, supra note 1, 13.
237. See C. CONSOMM. art. L.331-7-1 (2004).
238. The language of the statute is markedly different here for the first time: "elle re-
commende," as opposed to "elle peut recommender." See C. CONSOMM. art. L.331-7-1 (2004).
Cf supra note 204 and accompanying text.
239. Note that a return to the negotiated-plan stage of art. L.331-6 is not permitted-the
commission must proceed to the recommendation stage in art. L.331-7. See Sinay-Cytermann,
supra note 1, 20.
240. See supra notes 208-213 and accompanying text.
241. See C. CONSOMM. art. L.331-7-1 (2004).
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the commission must recommend a partial, pro-rata 4 2 extinguishment
(discharge) of most 243 of the debtor's obligations.'" The law leaves to the
case-by-case discretion of the commissions just what percentage of the
debtor's obligations to discharge. A debtor can benefit from such a dis-
charge only once every eight years.245
Even in this stage, designed for the seriously overburdened and
downtrodden,246 the debtor cannot escape paying at least some of her ob-
ligations (or at least evading the pursuits of her unpaid creditors). The
French model is very serious about reserving a U.S.-style "full dis-
charge" for only the most marginal of marginalized debtors. A full
discharge of all liabilities is available only for debtors whose insolvency
has been established as "irremediable," and only after the debtor has un-
dergone the simplified procedure of "personal recovery" (redressement
personnel), discussed in Part II.D., below.
3. The Gateway to Level Two: "Insolvency" On
the Books and In Practice
This "ultimate relief' was designed to be reserved for the "most des-
perate" cases of those who were unable to meet even the ongoing
expenses of daily life-the approximately 25% of debtors with abso-
lutely no ability to repay any portion of their debts.2 47 The legislature
restricted this new "extraordinary" relief to cases where the commission
establishes "insolvency of the debtor," defined as "the absence of re-
sources or of seizable goods of a nature to permit the discharge of all or
242. The Senate had recommended that the courts be given the ability to discharge cer-
tain debts more or less than others, but this proposal was not included in the amendment. See
Sinay-Cytermann, supra note 1, I 23-24. As it stands, the court may only enter a discharge
of a certain, equal percentage of all of the debtor's affected debts. See Circular of Mar. 24,
1999, supra note 132, § 3.4.3 (suggesting, for example, discharge of 50%, 60%, or 75% of all
of a debtor's debts).
243. Support obligations (child support and alimony), as well as fines, penalties, and
reparations orders entered in the context of a criminal case against the debtor, are not subject
to any form of relief-extension or discharge. See C. CONSOMM. art. L.333-1 (2004). In addi-
tion, the debtor's obligation to reimburse a guarantor (surety) or co-obligor who has paid the
guaranteed debt on behalf of the debtor is not subject to discharge. See C. CONSOMM. art.
L.331-7-1 (2004).
244. See C. CONSOMM. art. L.331-7-1 (2004).
245. See id.
246. See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
247. See ASSEMBLUE NATIONALE, REP. No. 1062, supra note 222, at 67 (describing the
intended beneficiaries of the law, those with "passive" indebtedness, characterized by "the
impossibility, pure and simple, to meet the needs of daily life" marked by a "total absence of
resources"); ASSEMBI9E NATIONALE, REP. No. 780 (1998), at 15, 28, available at http://
www.assemblee-nationale.fr/legislatures/1l/pdf/projets/p10780.pdf; ASEMBLE NATIONALE,
REP. No. 856, supra note 115, at 7; S9NAT, Avis, Doc. No. 478, available at http://
www.senat.fr/rap/197-478197-47832.html; Sinay-Cytermann, supra note 1, V 2, 11.
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part of his or her debts and rendering inapplicable the ["ordinary" pay-
ment-plan] measures foreseen in article L.331-7.''248 As thus strictly
defined, "insolvency" appears to exist only where the debtor possesses
absolutely no seizable goods (of whatever value) and has absolutely no
non-exempt income-otherwise, at least "a part" of the debtor's obliga-
tions could be met. 49
But the commissions and courts have construed "insolvency," and
thus the range of debtors eligible for "extraordinary" relief, rather
broadly. Already in March 1999, the economics ministry urged the
commissions essentially to abandon the rigid statutory definition of "in-
solvency." The economics ministry suggested that debtors should be
deemed insolvent if they could not meet all liabilities "within reasonable
delays., 250 The ministry further suggested ten years as a point of refer-
ence for the length of a "reasonable delay.' 251' Establishing insolvency
when the debtor cannot pay all of her debts in ten years seems to fly in
the face of the legislative requirement of no ability to pay even "a part"
of existing obligations. The ministry boldly suggested reading out the
first part of the statutory definition, focusing on the second: While the
commissions need not make the unlikely finding that the debtor is totally
unable to pay any small part of any obligation whatsoever, they should
establish that the debtor cannot meet all obligations through a ten-year
"ordinary" payment plan, with payment extensions and interest-rate re-
ductions. According to the economics ministry, if the provisions of "old"
law cannot offer effective relief, the "new" law of global deferral and
discharge ought to be available.
The courts seem to have also construed "insolvency" rather liberally.
In 2002, a certain Ms. Djerrad filed a declaration of over-indebtedness,
owing her creditors the equivalent of just over $37,200.22 After meeting
ongoing expenses of $1160 per month, the debtor had "disposable in-
come" of just under $150 per month.253 Over the 120 months of a ten-
year "ordinary" plan,254 this debtor theoretically could have paid her
248. C. CONSOMM. art. L.331-7-1 (2004).
249. See, e.g., KHAYAT, supra note 9, at 113.
250. See Circular of Mar. 24, 1999, supra note 132, 3.4.
251. See id.
252. See Cass. le civ., Oct. 2, 2002, RTDCoM. 2003, p. 173, note Gilles Paisant. The
note reports that Ms. Djerrad owed 257,000 F. On February 17, 2002, France adopted the Euro
as its official currency, and the permanent exchange rate was set at 6.55957 French Francs per
Euro. See http://www.oanda.com/site/euro.shtml. During 2002, the average exchange rate for
one Euro was $0.95. See http://www.oanda.com/site/euro.shtml.
253. See Paisant, supra note 252, at 173 (reporting income of 9000 F and expenses of
"more than" 8000 F per month).
254. See C. CONSOMM. arts. L.331-6, L.331-7 (2004) (setting ten years as the maximum
duration of a payment plan).
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creditors nearly $18,000-about half of her debt. Nevertheless, the trial
court found her to be "insolvent."255 Although the Cour de cassation
overturned this decision, citing the lower court's failure to consider the
value of the debtor's apartment, it explained its ruling by suggesting that
a sale of the apartment might "carry off a discharge of debt sufficient to
permit a recovery of the debtor's situation by application of the meas-
ures provided for in article L.33 1-7."256 In other words, the French high
court also seems to be focused on the second part of the definition of
"insolvency;" the question is not whether or not the debtor can pay any
portion of any debt, but rather, whether a payment plan with "ordinary"
measures (payment extensions and interest rate reductions) can resolve
the debtor's financial problems entirely.
During the same time period, another court confronted this issue
squarely and interpreted the notion of "insolvency" extremely freely.
There, the debtor owed just under $40,000, which clearly could not be
paid in full with her just under $200 monthly disposable income.
5 7 But
dedicating all of this disposable income over a ten-year ordinary plan,
the debtor could have paid $24,000-over half of her debt. Yet the court
once again found the debtor to be "insolvent," noting that this notion
"cannot be reserved to only the situations of those whose payment ca-
pacity is inexistent.,,21' The reporter of this case noted the inconsistency
between the literal statutory definition of "insolvency" and the very lib-
eral definition applied by the court; the court effectively read out the "or
part" from "discharge all or part of his or her debts" in the definition of
insolvency, "privileging its spirit over its 
letter.' 259
The French high court has not dealt with this case yet, but it seems
to have signaled its acceptance of the liberal approach to defining "in-
solvency." In a 2001 order, the Cour de cassation affirmed the
combination of required payments with "extraordinary" measures
(which require "insolvency"). 26° This order inevitably signals the high
court's view that a debtor who can pay some but not all of her debts is
"insolvent" despite the literal statutory definition.
255. See id. For a similar case, see CA Caen, ler ch., Oct. 18, 2001, RTDCoM. 2002, pp.
172-73, note Gilles Paisant (overturning the lower court and entering a partial discharge for a
debtor owing 140,000 F (just over $20,000) with monthly disposable income of 500 F ($72)
for eight years, and 250 F ($36) thereafter-a total of $7775 over ten years, more than one-
third of her total debt).
256. See Paisant, supra note 252, at 173 (emphasis added).
257. See Trib. inst. Vienne, Nov. 25, 2002, RG No. 11-02-000596, RTDCoM. 2003, p.
174, at 175, note Gilles Paisant.
258. See id.
259. Id.
260. Arret [Order] of Feb. 13, 2001, Bull. civ. 1, no. 34, JCP 2001, IV, 1638, RTDCoM.
2001, p. 783, note Gilles Paisant; see also RTDCoM. 2003, p. 175, note Gilles Paisant.
Winter 2005]
Michigan Journal of International Law
4. Effective Relief Rarely Applied
Nonetheless, despite their broad construction of possible application
of global payment deferrals and discharge, commissions and courts have
actually applied these "extraordinary" measures of relief quite rarely. A
2001 Banque de France survey revealed that "extraordinary" recommen-
dations constituted only 38% of all recommendations submitted to the
courts.16' This represents only 10% of all cases handled by the commis-
262sions. The ultimate relief of discharge of debt was recommended in
only 17% of the "extraordinary" cases, only about 2% of all of the cases
administered by the commissions.263
Later statistics reflect that the commissions have continued to con-
fine "extraordinary" relief to only a few cases, but the ratio of
"extraordinary" to "ordinary" recommendations has grown recently. The
commissions recommended global payment deferrals and discharges in
between 10% and 13% of all administered cases from 2001 to 2004, but
the percentage of total recommendations that included these "extraordi-
nary" measures grew from about 36% in 2001 and 2002 to about 45% in
2003 and 2004.264 The percentage of recommended discharges of debt
has increased slightly, as well. Recommendations for some sort of dis-
charge rose from about 18% of all "extraordinary" recommendations in
2001 to about 30% in 2003 and 2004, and from 1.7% of all administered
cases in 2001 to about 4% in 2003 and 2004.265 The trend is toward
growth of these "extraordinary" solutions, but the trend line is rising ex-
tremely slowly. Once again, the French commissions appear to be
vigilantly guarding the ultimate relief of discharge of debt, offering it to
only a choice few.
261. See BANQUE DE FRANCE SURVEY, supra note 115, at 2-3, 25. Although the survey
included only cases submitted to the commissions between April 9 and June 8, 2001, its data
accurately reflected the general percentage of the various "levels" of relief offered. For exam-
ple, the study analyzed 8600 cases resulting in either a payment plan or recommendations, of
which, 72% (6200) represented agreed payment plans. See id. at 2. This is consistent with the
approximately 70% of cases concluding with an agreed plan in each year between 1996 and
.2003. See supra note 150.
262. See BANQUE DE FRANCE SURVEY, supra note 115, at 2 (reporting 8600 cases result-
ing in agreed plans or recommendations, and 2400 cases involving recommendations, of
which 38% equals 912 cases of "extraordinary" recommendations).
263. See BANQUE DE FRANCE SURVEY, supra note 115, at 2, 26 (reporting 8600 total
administered cases, and of 2400 cases involving recommendations, 6.5% (156) involved dis-
charge of debt).
264. See AFSF STATISTICs 2004, supra note 150 (reporting about 30-40,000 recommen-
dations per year from 2001 to 2004, of which 11-19,000 were "extraordinary").
265. See AFSF STATISTICS 2004, supra note 150 (reporting 2036 recommended dis-
charges in 2001, 3368 in 2002, 5327 in 2003, and 5845 in 2004).
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D. Level Three, "Personal Recovery":
Toward a U.S. -Style System
The 2001 survey by the Banque de France provided the impetus for
the latest round of reform. The data reported in that survey suggested to
legislators that the commissions were not implementing effective relief
for the most over-indebted consumers.266 Legislators noted with concern
that, although 27% of debtors exhibited no ability at all to repay any of
their debts, only a small fraction of debtors ultimately received effective
relief, either through voluntary remission of debt by creditors or through
court-imposed discharge.26 ' The data from this survey revealed the depths
of financial despair to which some consumers had sunk. A significant
fraction of debtors were not only "insolvent," but their insolvency was
clearly not a transitory condition. From the outset their files clearly
showed that these debtors would remain unable to pay any significant
portion of their debts even after a two-year global payment deferral.
266
For these debtors, the "moratorium" represented a pure formality, and
their complex cases placed a grossly disproportional administrative bur-
den on the commissions.269 These debtors needed efficient and effective
relief immediately.
1. "Final" Legislative Reform
Thus, the legislature took up consumer debt relief yet again in the
summer of 2003 and finally introduced a "fresh start
' 270 procedure for dis-
charging all debts immediately. Designed to offer a "second chance" to the
most deeply indebted consumers,27' the latest and final level of French
consumer debt relief strongly resembles the U.S. consumer bankruptcy
266. See StNAT, Avis, Doc. No. 404, supra note 125, at 12; S12NAT, Avis, Doc. No. 405,
supra note 112, at 151-52; ASSEMBLE NATIONALE, Avis, Doc. No. 1002, at 10 (2003), avail-
able at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/pdf/rapports/rIO02.pdf.
267. See StNAT, Avis, Doc. No. 405, supra note 112, at 151-52 (citing the Banque de
France's survey data); ASSEMBLtE NATIONALE, Avis, Doc. No. 1002, supra note 266, at 10
(same).
268. See COMITt CONSULTATIF DU CONSEIL NATIONAL DU CREDIT ET DU TITRE, RAP-
PORT 2002-2003 § 2.2.2.2 (2003), available at http://www.banquedefrance.fr/banquede_
france/fr/telnomot/infobafi/rapcc_02_- 03.pdf.
269. See ASSEMBLtE NATIONALE, Avis, Doc. No. 1003, TOM III, at 36 (2003), available
at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/pdf/rapports/rI003-3.pdf (noting that the new proce-
dure would greatly alleviate the burden on the Banque de France and the commissions, as the
most critical one-third of cases represented on average 80% of the administrative burden of
the commissions).
270. The French purposely adopted the U.S. term, translating it literally "nouveau dd-
part." See, e.g., S9NAT, Avis, Doc. No. 404, supra note 125, at 15; StNAT, Avis, Doc. No.
405, supra note 112, at 164; Cyrille Charbonneau & Frdd6ric-Jdr6me Pansier, Prisentation
des dispositions relatives au surendettement dans la loi d'orientation et de programmation
pour la ville et la rdnovation urbaine, GAZ. PAL. 2003, 2765, at 2765.
271. See, e.g. ASSEMBLtE NATIONALE, Avis, Doc. No. 1003, supra note 269, at 13-14.
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model: Eliminating the payment-plan stage altogether, the new measures
call for liquidation of the debtor's assets almost immediately after the
filing of the case, after which the court swiftly orders a discharge of all
indebtedness.
Proposals for a U.S.-style system of immediate liquidation and dis-
charge had circulated from the very first consideration of consumer debt
relief in France nearly fifteen years ago. Indeed, these proposals pre-
ceded the payment-plan-oriented proposals that ultimately emerged as
the Loi Neiertz272 in 1989. Since as early as 1877, in the northeastern de-
partments of Upper Rhine, Lower Rhine, and Moselle, local law has
offered indebted consumers relief in a procedure called civil bankruptcy
(faillite civile), essentially a streamlined version of the "commercial
bankruptcy" available to merchants throughout France.273 This civil
bankruptcy is virtually identical to Chapter 7 consumer bankruptcy in
the United States, although the consumer has to establish her "insol-
vency" to qualify for relief.274 The Secretary of State for Consumer
Affairs originally recommended in January 1989 that this U.S.-stylefail-
lite civile simply be extended to the whole of France.27' Again in April
1989, similar proposals emerged, along with a slightly modified proposal
suggesting a combination of possible payment plans and immediate dis-
charges.276
Legislators rejected these proposals to adopt civil bankruptcy more
broadly for a number of reasons. Primary among them were: (1) fear of
encouraging irresponsible borrowing by debtors; (2) concerns about the
high cost of the procedure (as high as F 20,000, around $3000277);
(3) worry about an increased burden on the courts; and (4) desire to
avoid the social and economic "infamy" associated with public an-
nouncements of the names of debtors benefiting from the procedure.278
After over a decade of struggling with "ordinary" and "extraordinary"
payment plans under the Loi Neiertz, however, the government and legis-
lature finally had to acknowledge the utility of the simple and effective
faillite civile model and the ease with which its pitfalls could be
avoided.279
272. See supra note 109 for an explanation of this common designation of the French
consumer bankruptcy law.
273. See, e.g., Jean-Luc Vallens, Lafaillite civile: Une institution du droit local d'Alsace
etde Moselle, JCP 1989, 1, 3387, 1.
274. See id. 16, 23; KHAYAT, supra note 9, at 26-29.
275. See Salomon, supra note 135, at 19.
276. See Paisant, supra note 29, 8.
277. See ASSEMBLE NATIONALE, REP. No. 856, supra note 115, at 34.
278. See, e.g., HYEST & LORIDANT, supra note 25, §§ I.A.1, I.A.2(a), IIl.A.2; Sinay-
Cytermann, supra note 1, 4; Cte, supra note 2, 1 39.
279. See S9NAT, Avis, Doc. No. 405, supra note 112, at 158.
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The legislature explicitly modeled its latest form of debt relief on the
faillite civile system still available in Alsace and Moselle.8 Mindful of
serious politico-rhetorical issues, though, legislators deftly avoided the
term "bankruptcy" (faillite), calling their new level of relief "personal
recovery" (ritablissement personnel) .i
Unlike the U.S. model, both in theory and in practice, the French
system reserves this "ultimate" measure of relief for those few debtors
who are most financially overburdened and economically marginalized.
This final level of relief is available only to debtors whose situation the
commission identifies as "irremediably compromised. 282 This term of art
is defined as "the manifest impossibility to put in place the treatment
measures" in articles L.331-6, L.331-7, and L.331-7-1; that is, a pay-
ment plan with "ordinary" or "extraordinary" recommendations. 8 3 The
National Assembly originally proposed adding specifically that it must
be manifestly impossible to discharge the debtor's entire debt burden
through implementation of "ordinary" or "extraordinary" measures,
given the debtor's current and future assets and income . 2 The Senate,
however, rejected this proposal. The Senate preferred a policy strongly
emphasizing any possible application of the "traditional" payment-plan
procedure, minimizing the use of the new "personal recovery" proce-
dure.28 5 The Senate strongly opposed allowing debtors to equate
liquidation of their property with discharge of all of their debts while
continuing to benefit from "substantial and stable revenue" without be-
ing required to contribute anything to their creditors.2 6 This vague
definition is designed to allow the greatest margin of flexibility for the
commissions and courts.
28 7
Thus, a U.S.-style "get-out-of-jail-free" discharge of liability is
available only to French debtors who are so overburdened that no pay-
ment plan, even one extending over ten years, could possibly retire any
significant portion of their debts. If the debtor might pay off even a
280. See, e.g., ASEMBLtE NATIONALE, Avis, Doc. No. 1003, supra note 269, at 14, 81;
ASSEMBLfE NATIONALE, Avis, Doc. No. 1001, supra note 112, at 12, 32; S9NAT, Avis, Doc.
No. 404, supra note 125, at 15, 61. In 1997, Senators Hyest and Loridant had proposed a
system somewhat similar to the one ultimately adopted in 2003. See HYEST & LORIDANT,
supra note 25, § III.B.5.
281. See C. CONSOMM. art. L.330-1 (2004); see also CMte, supra note 2, [ 39 (noting the
rhetorical issue).
282. See C. CONSOMM. art. L.331-3 (2004).
283. See id. art. L.330-1 (2004).
284. See ASSEMBLE NATIONALE, Avis, Doc. No. 1001, supra note 112, at 21,51.
285. See StNAT, Avis, Doc. No. 404, supra note 125, at 23, 49-5 1.
286. See id. at 50-51.
287. See, e.g., C6te, supra note 2, 29.
288. See ASSEMBLE NATIONALE, Avis, Doc. No. 1002, supra note 266, at 15 (noting
that the new procedure was needed by that 27% of debtors with no payment capacity at all);
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significant portion of debt, a combination of "ordinary" and "extraordi-
nary" measures in a payment plan remains the preferred solution . 9
Indeed, one of the provisions of the new procedure reminds the judge
that, if she believes that "judicial liquidation can be avoided, the judge
shall" instead establish a payment plan containing "ordinary" measures
(payment extensions and interest rate reductions). 29° Additionally, if the
court subsequently discovers that the debtor's situation is no longer "ir-
remediably compromised," the judge must return the case to the
commission for the development of an agreed or recommended payment
plan.29'
2. The Process of "Personal Recovery"
Here once again, the commission remains the gatekeeper to relief.
After the debtor files a declaration, the commission must determine
within six months whether the debtor's situation is "irremediably com-
promised 292 Only if the commission so finds, may it then direct the case
to the court for the opening of a procedure of "personal recovery.,
293
Within one month, the court verifies the "irremediably compromised"
nature of the debtor's situation, as well as her good faith, and enters an
order opening a "personal recovery" proceeding.9
ASSEMBI9E NATIONALE, Avis, Doc. No. 1003, supra note 269, at 25, 36, 82 (suggesting that
the new procedure was designed for "the most critical one-third of cases," including those
involving "a great number of creditors").
289. See S9NAT, Avis, Doc. No. 404, supra note 125, at 51; Charbonneau & Pansier,
supra note 270, at 2766. See also supra note 260 and accompanying text (describing the
French high court's acceptance of the notion of combining required partial payment of debt
with "extraordinary" recommendations for partial discharge). Indeed, carrying forward its
insistence on requiring maximal efforts from debtors to pay something to their creditors, the
legislature imposed a new requirement on the old U.S.-style "faillite civile" still in force in
Alsace and in Moselle. Today, for the first time, the court can require a contribution from the
debtor, payable to creditors over a period of up to two years, as a prerequisite tofaillite civile
relief. See id. at 83.
290. See C. CONSOMM. art. L.332-10 (2004). The legislative history suggests that such a
situation might arise because the judge, from a position of authority, might be more persuasive
than the Banque de France in cajoling creditors into agreeing to a reasonable plan involving
remission of part of their claims. See ASSEMBLgE NATIONALE, Avis, Doc. No. 1003, supra
note 269, at 86.
291. See C. CONSOMM. art. L.332-12 (2004).
292. See C. CONSOMM. art. L.331-3 (2004).
293. See id. If the commission fails to make a determination within nine months, or if
the debtor disagrees with the commission's negative determination, the debtor may lodge a
request directly with the court to open a procedure of "personal recovery." See id. art. L.332-5
(2004).
294. See C. CONSOMM. art. L.332-6 (2004). The opening of a "personal recovery" proce-
dure acts as an immediate and automatic stay of all non-support collections actions initiated
against the debtor. See id.; cf II U.S.C. § 362 (2004) (similarly staying actions against the
debtor after the commencement of U.S. bankruptcy proceedings). For all other cases, which
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After the case is officially opened, the procedure progresses much
like the process in U.S. Bankruptcy Court. Either the judge 295 or a court-
appointed trustee296 identifies and verifies the claims against the debtor,
and catalogues the debtor's income2 97 and available assets,298 although
one suspects that most debtors at this stage will have very few if any
available assets .2  If the debtor has available assets, the trustee has four
months to catalogue them, and either the trustee or a liquidator will pro-
ceed to sell them and partition the proceeds among creditors.3°° This
procedure does not require the debtor to dedicate any of her future in-
come to payment of creditors-presumably because, if she had any
significant seizable future income, she would be ineligible for this pro-
cedure, and the court would impose an "ordinary" or "extraordinary"
payment plan, perhaps with a partial discharge.
Upon completion of the sale--or after the court has established that
the debtor has no available assets-the court announces the closure of the
proceedings for "asset insufficiency."0' Such closure signals the immedi-
ate "erasure" (discharge) of all of the debtor's non-professional debts,02
other than those few specifically excepted from discharge. 303 The court
may, but need not, order the debtor to undertake measures of "social
progress through the commission, the debtor or the commission must request that the court
enter a stay of collections actions. See C. CONSOMM. art. L.331-5 (2004).
295. Because most cases at this stage will involve few if any available assets, the judge
alone, by default, will make the required findings regarding the debtor's economic and social
situation, presumably based only on the case file. See C. CONSOMM. art. L.332-7 (2004); C6te,
supra note 2, 35.
296. The trustee, if any, is paid E200 ($240) for cataloguing the debtor's "economic and
social situation." See Arret6 [Order] of Mar. 29, 2004, art. 1, available at http://
www.legifrance.gouv.fr/imagesJO/2004/063/JO200406364.pdf. If the debtor has no available
assets, this fee is paid either out of the debtor's future income-if the court so orders--or is
borne by the state. See id. art. 1; C. CONSOMM. art. R.332-13 (2004). If the debtor has seizable
assets, the trustee and liquidator receive a portion of the sale proceeds. See id. art. 2.
297. The trustee must review the debtor's income in one last-chance effort to revert to a
payment plan. See C. CONsoMM. art. R. 332-19 (2004).
298. See C. CONSOMM. arts. L.332-6, L.332-7 (2004).
299. The law dose not explicitly incorporate the list of assets that are exempt from sei-
zure outside "bankruptcy." Instead, it states that "movable goods necessary to the debtor's
ongoing life and non-professional goods indispensable to the exercise of the debtor's profes-
sional activity" are excluded from liquidation in the "personal recovery" process. See C.
CONSOMM. art. L.332-8 (2004). This definition is very similar to the one for exempt property
outside of "bankruptcy," although most cars are clearly exempt under the new definition, and
the Senate noted the similarity with approval. See S9NAT, Avis, Doc. No. 404, supra note 125,
at 67-68; see also Charbonneau & Pansier, supra note 270, at 2768.
300. See C. CONsoMM. art. L.332-8 (2004). The sale can be amicable (private sale) or
forced (public auction), and the liquidator may take as long as twelve months to complete it.
See id.
301. See C. CONsoMM. art. L.332-9 (2004).
302. See id.
303. See supra note 243.
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follow-up.' '3° The content of these measures is vested in the unfettered
discretion of each judge, but the legislative history suggests that the
debtor might be required to seek counseling on how to manage a
budget. °5 Debtors can undergo a "personal recovery" as often and as
many times as necessary."
3. A Slow Start for the New Procedure
The new "personal recovery" procedure was designed for the 25% to
33% of debtors with no payment capacity, °7 and legislative planners es-
timated that the new procedure would implicate about 35,000 cases
annually.30 During the first several months of the new procedure, though,
the commissions have sent relatively few cases to the courts for "per-
sonal recovery" proceedings, and not all debtors have agreed to go. In
the first ten months of availability of the new procedure,3 6 the commis-
sions considered 124,007 cases for referral to the courts for "personal
recovery."3 ' Of these, the commissions referred only 22,030 cases, re-
taining the remainder in the "traditional" process.3 ' Thus, the new
procedure has been invoked in about 18% of cases in which it was con-
sidered, which constitutes just under 14% of all cases administered
304. See C. CONSOMM. art. L.332-9 (2004).
305. See ASSEMBL9E NATIONALE, Avis, Doc. No. 1003, supra note 269, at 85. For an
interesting discussion of the practice of several Chapter 13 trustees implementing similar
programs in the United States, see Jean Braucher, Debtor Education in Bankruptcy: The Per-
spective of Interest Analysis, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 319, 323-
32 (Johanna Niemi-Kiesilainen, lain Ramsay & William Whitford eds., 2003).
306. Oddly enough, one can receive a partial discharge only once every eight years. See
C. CONSOMM. art. L.33 1-7-1 (2004). Early proposals suggested limiting the "personal recov-
ery" total discharge procedure to once in a lifetime. See ASSEMBLtE NATIONALE, Avis, Doc.
No. 1003, supra note 269, at 88; ASSEMBLfE NATIONALE, Avis, Doc. No. 1002, supra note
266, at 28. The Senate rejected these proposals, noting that some people may need a "fresh
start" more than once during their lifetimes. See StNAT, Avis, Doc. No. 404, supra note 125,
at 23, 74; S9NAT, Avis, DOC. No. 405, supra note 112, at 174. Nonetheless, the courts might
interpret the requirement of "good faith" to exclude "serial filers" from later proceedings. See
Rondey, supra note 208, at 2166.
307. See supra note 288.
308. See ASSEMBLtE NATIONALE, Avis, DOC. No. 1001, supra note 112, at 5. This figure
fairly represents 27% of the 134,000 total administered cases from 2003. See AFSF STATIS-
TICS, supra note 115 (showing 134,261 cases in which the agreed plan phase had concluded,
either successfully or not, in 2003).
309. The new procedure has been available only since February 25, 2004, the day on
which an implementing regulation appeared in the Official Journal. See Decree No. 2004-180
of Feb. 24, 2004, J.O., Feb. 25, 2004, p. 3757, D.S.L. 2004, 611; MINISTkRE D9LEGUE A LA
VILLE ET X LA RENOVATION URBAINE, INFORMATION PRESSE, RFORME DU SURENDETTEMENT
DES PARTICULIERS: PUBLICATION DU DECRET D'APPLICATION (2004), available at http://
www.ville.gouv.fr/pdf/actualite/presse/surendettement-2004.pdf.
310. See AFSF STATISTICS 2004, supra note 150.
311. See id.
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during this period. Currently available statistics encompass relatively
few cases pending longer than the six-month period for consideration of
new cases, so these already significant numbers may rise in the coming
months."3 Initial indicators suggest that commissions remain somewhat
reticent but are beginning to accept the "ultimate" form of relief.
Surprisingly, many debtors also apparently remain reticent. The
debtor must agree to referral of her case for the new proceeding '14 Of the
22,030 cases referred thus far, only 16,321 debtors have agreed to go
forward with a "personal recovery" proceeding.3"5 Not every debtor has
indicated her assent or refusal, but 2347 have affirmatively refused.3 6
E. The Road Ahead
In its fifteen-year existence, the French law of "consumer overin-
debtedness" has never gone longer than five years without an
amendment. The Banque de France and others have been monitoring the
system carefully, and the legislature has been quick to respond to per-
ceived deficiencies. The next round of reforms is likely no more than a
few years away, and at least three trends suggest possible areas ripe for
legislative reevaluation.
1. Rising Filings: A System Under Increasing Stress
Just like in the United States and Germany, consumer over-
indebtedness filings are significantly on the rise in France. In the first
year of the Loi Neiertz, tens of thousands of requests for relief over-
whelmed the commissions and courts: Over 90,000 French consumers
sought relief from their debts in 1990.3 ' Filings fell off significantly over
the subsequent years, but then surged at the end of the 1990s. Total fil-
ings returned to their 1990 level in 1997, with over 95,000 filings, then
rocketed up to nearly 118,000 in 1998 and 142,000 in 1999.3"8 As the
312. See id. (reporting 159,222 cases in 2004 referred for personal recovery or conclud-
ing with an agreed plan or commission recommendation).
313. Future monthly reports of the statistics of the over-indebtedness commissions
will be indexed at http://www.asf-france.com/COMMloptcomm/publications/Selcirculaires/
selection.htm.
314. See C. CONSOMM. art. L.331-3 (2004).
315. See AFSF STATISTIcs 2004, supra note 150.
316. See id.
317. See BANQUE DE FRANCE SURVEY, supra note 115, annex 1 bis (reporting 90,174
total filings in 1990).
318. See id. (reporting 68,075 filings in 1991; 63,830 in 1992; 68,863 in 1993; 68,608 in
1994; 70,112 in 1995; 86,999 in 1996; 95,756 in 1997; 117,854 in 1998; and 142,219 in
1999).
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twenty-first century opened, nearly 150,000 French consumers flocked
to the commissions.1 9
The last three years have witnessed sustained filing levels, and re-
cent statistics portend no easing of the burden on the system. Nearly
138,000 consumers filed for debt relief in 2001, rising to 145,000 in
2002, 165,000 in 2003, and 188,000 in 2004.320 These numbers undoubt-
edly will begin to take a heavy toll on an already overstressed system of
commissions and courts in the months and years to come. The commis-
sions seem to be making little headway in dealing with the backlog of
approximately 70,000 cases that has awaited commission action for quite
some time.32'
We may well see a simplification of the system over the next several
years as the commissions begin to groan under the weight of tens of
thousands of relatively complex cases. The statistics thus far suggest that
the commissions are beginning to ease their burden by diverting more
cases to the simplified "personal recovery" system,322 and this trend may
well continue or even accelerate.
2. Repeat Filers and an Impending Breakdown of the Plan Stage
Compared to their northern-European neighbors, French consumers
carry a much lighter debt burden,323 yet consumer debt-relief filings in
France outpace those in Germany nearly three to one.324 Why? The Ban-
que de France suggests that a combination of factors accounts for the
rise in filings in France, but prominent among them is a high level of
repeat filings. In its 2001 survey, the Banque de France revealed that
30% of the cases surveyed represented repeat filers.3 26 The primary rea-
son why these debtors had filed for relief a second time was the
expiration of a payment deferral in a plan that initially failed to provide
effective relief.327 Another substantial portion of repeat filings was attrib-
319. See id. (reporting 148,435 total filings in 2000).
320. See AFSF STATISTICS 2004, supra note 150.
321. Data on the backlog of cases in process or waiting during the past 12 months are
available in the individual statistical reports for each month, available at http://www.asf-
france.conCOMM/optcommlpublications/Selcirculaires/selection.htm.
322. See supra Part II.D.3.
323. See supra note 36.
324. See supra note 105 (reporting only 60,000 consumer insolvency filings in Germany
in 2003).
325. See Vatin, supra note 127, at 112.
326. See BANQUE DE FRANCE SURVEY, supra note 115, at 27.
327. See id. at 27 & tbl. 35 (reporting that "expiration of a deferral" accounted for 45.9%
of all repeat filings).
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utable to a change in circumstance that made compliance with the pay-
ment plan impossible.32
These findings support earlier warnings that the enormously success-
ful payment-plan stage of the system is poised for an impending
breakdown. In the late 1990s, the government consumer agency had
suggested that 75% of all pending payment plans were destined for fail-
ure.3 29 In a system where 80%-85% of cases conclude with a payment
plan,3 problems with those plans threaten to seriously undermine the
system, particularly if a substantial portion of affected debtors are forced
to seek relief a second time. This Article has described fundamental
problems with numerous plans negotiated or imposed in the 1990s,"'
most critically, a consistently deficient budget left to debtors to cover
ongoing expenses.332 If debtors have not yet felt the pain of these miserly
plans, it is likely only a matter of time.
With an average duration of 8 to 10 years, a sharply increased num-
ber of French payment plans implemented in the late 1990s will
conclude over the next several years. Unfortunately, no statistical system
tracks the ultimate fate of these plans, but a spike in filings-including a
substantial number of second-time filers-attests to a coming crisis.
Even if the commissions now have learned from experience and are rec-
ommending more feasible plans, the next several years will likely testify
to their mistakes of the past. We can expect to see a growing number of
failed plans in France in the coming years.
3. Serious Inequities Across Districts: The Problem
of Local Legal Culture
United States scholars have observed and criticized the phenomenon
dubbed "Local Legal Culture,"3 33 in which similar cases receive vastly
different treatment depending upon the extra-legal culture of the locale
in which the case is treated. If nothing else can be said about the future
of the French consumer debt-relief system, one can predict with absolute
confidence that the Local Legal Culture phenomenon will pose a con-
tinuing problem.
328. See id. (reporting that change in circumstance accounted for 33.72% of repeat fil-
ings).
329. See supra note 173.
330. See supra notes 150 and 215 and accompanying text.
331. See supra Part II.B.2.
332. See supra Part II.B.2(c).
333. See, e.g., Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The
Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy
Courts, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 801 (1994); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Local Legal Cul-
ture and the Fear of Abuse, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 25 (1998); Jean Braucher, Lawyers
and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501 (1993).
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The legislature addressed the serious problem of inequality among
commissions in the allocation of payment plan budgets, 34 but significant
disparities continue.35 Likewise, commissions differ widely in the relief
they are willing to recommend in payment plans. More fundamentally,
the requirements for access to the most effective relief--discharge of
debt-are defined in such a vague way ("insolvency" and "irremediably
compromised") as to make wide variances across districts inevitable.
German lawmakers largely avoided these problems by requiring the
same level of payment over the same number of years from all debtors,
and in granting the ultimate relief of discharge to all debtors who make it
through the six year "good behavior period.' 336 French legislators opted
for a more discretionary U.S.-model. Perhaps positive experience across
the northeastern border will ultimately convince French lawmakers to
revisit the law with an eye to avoiding the pernicious effect of Local Le-
gal Cultural variances.
III. WHAT CAN THE U.S. LEARN FROM ALL OF THIS?
The well-documented development of the French consumer debt re-
lief system offers many lessons for United States policymakers. It is all
too easy simply to transpose numbers and suggest that what works in
France should work in the United States or elsewhere. But at the very
least, evaluating consumer debt relief from the perspective of another
modem system sheds useful light on United States consumer bankruptcy
policy. One can and should ask whether and to what extent some general
themes prevalent in France might improve U.S. practice. I will conclude
by commenting on three points that strike me as particularly provocative
for U.S. policy.
A. Is There a "Problem" of Overly Elevated
Filings in the United States?
Data on consumer indebtedness and levels of bankruptcy filings in
France challenge the notion that the United States has a problem with
excessive consumer bankruptcy filings. The French are renowned for
their "historically low ... propensity to borrow,"3 yet consumer over-
indebtedness filings continue to climb higher each year. Between 2001
and 2003, nearly 450,000 French consumers sought legal relief from
334. See supra notes 182-183 and accompanying text.
335. See COMITt CONSULTATIF DU CONSEIL NATIONAL DU CRtDIT ET DU TITRE, supra
note 268, § 2.2.3.2.
336. See supra text at note 102.
337. See MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, supra note 32, at 7.
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their debts.338 In other words, three-quarters of one percent of the entire
French population declared themselves unable to deal with their debts
over the last three years.33 9 During the same period, over 4.6 million U.S.
consumers declared bankruptcy. 3' ° This represents 1.6% of the total U.S.
population. 34' Thus, in percentage terms, about twice as many U.S. con-
sumers sought relief from their debts as did French consumers.
Consistent with these figures, the debt burden of U.S. consumers is
about twice as heavy as that weighing on French consumers. The Euro-
pean Credit Research Institute reported that, in 1996, total household
debt represented 49.8% of the disposable income of the average French
household, but 91.3% of the disposable income of the average U.S.
household. '42 Consumer (non-housing) debt represented 8.3% of average
household disposable income in France, but 21.5% in the U.S. 343 The fact
that filing rates and debt loads bear the same ratio between France and
the United States certainly cannot be viewed as "proof' of anything. But
these numbers represent at least an intriguing coincidence that, in my
view, suggests something important about the infatuation in the United
States with elevated filing levels.
French statistics tend to belie any suggestion that high U.S. con-
sumer bankruptcy filing rates reflect scheming consumers and an overly
permissive relief system. Victorian notions of a lack of "responsibility"
among U.S. consumers do not stand up to the similarly high filing rate of
French consumers. The French system demands much more responsibil-
ity of filers than does the U.S. system, yet filing numbers are climbing in
France at a rate comparable with the United States given the respective
levels of consumer debt. Whether United States and French consumers
rely more than they should on credit is a separate and more difficult
question. A comparison of debt burden and frequency of filing, however,
suggests that French and U.S. consumers seek relief in numbers that are
largely consistent with the average debt burden in their country. A high
case load seems to have less to do with how much "responsibility" the
system demands of filers. Instead, a high rate of filings seems to track
how heavily debt weighs upon the population of consumers.
I submit that the French figures at least call into question any claim
that the United States has some "problem" with excessive consumer
338. See supra note 320 (reporting total filings of 448,833 from 2001-2003).
339. See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACT BOOK, France, People,
available at http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/fr.html (estimating total
French population at just over 60 million as of July 2004).
340. See supra note 99 (reporting total filings of 4,616,349 from 2001-2003).
341. The U.S. Census website reports a total U.S. population of just under 294 million as
of June 2004. See http://www.census.gov.
342. See GUARDIA, supra note 28, at 49 & tbl. A14.
343. See id. at 53 & tbl. A18.
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bankruptcy filings. Both countries have learned that consumer lending
and borrowing benefits both the general quality of consumer life and the
overall economy, but accidents and misjudgments are a normal part of
life, particularly for the average consumer. The problem is not providing
relief to "too many" people who find themselves unable to cope due to
misjudgments or unexpected "accidents of life." The problem is deluging
consumers with complex offers of credit when they are unprepared to
understand their terms, appreciate their possible consequences, or plan
for future income disruptions. 3" The new open credit economy produces
casualties, and U.S. policymakers should learn from their French col-
leagues to view the need to deal compassionately with those casualties
not as a problem, but as a serious side effect of an open consumer credit
system.
345
B. Changing Attitudes: Could Negotiated
Payment Plans Work in the United States?
Unlike the "liberal" U.S. model, the French consumer debt relief
system emphasizes an element of "repayment morality." In addition to
offering relief to debtors in need, the emerging European consumer
bankruptcy systems aim to inculcate the morality of paying one's
debts. 34 6 This is clearly true in France and Germany. In both France and
Germany, virtually every case begins with a negotiation with creditors
and a good faith attempt at an agreed solution to the debtor's problems.
The results of these negotiations are striking: an agreed plan emerges
from this stage in 70% of cases in France and 30% in Germany. More-
over, almost every debtor spends years either attempting to make some
payment to creditors or awaiting a determination that any such attempt
would be futile.
Would the U.S. system not benefit from similar efforts to emphasize
payment morality? While it might impress upon debtors some sense of
responsibility to force them into the process of negotiating with credi-
tors, this process would likely produce far less satisfactory results in the
United States for several reasons. First, the primary drivers of policy and
practice in the United States and France occupy very different positions
of trust and leverage with respect to creditors. Before the Banque de
France stepped in to lobby creditors to cooperate in the plan process,
344. For a wonderful discussion of the psychological dimensions of consumers' inability
to plan for potential financial problems and the new theories of "behavioral economics," see
Saul Schwartz, Personal Bankruptcy Law: A Behavioral Perspective, in CONSUMER BANK-
RUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 61 (Johanna Niemi-Kiesiliinen, Iain Ramsay & William
Whitford eds., 2003).
345. See Lagarde, supra note 222, 3; Morin, supra note 28, at 139.
346. See Niemi-Kiesildinen, supra note 10, at 53-54, 59.
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only 45% of cases ended with an agreed plan. As principal negotiator
and liaison between the public and the debt relief system, the Banque de
France deserves most of the credit for the astounding success rate of
signing debtors and creditors to payment plans. In contrast, the lawyers
and trustees in charge of the U.S. consumer bankruptcy system enjoy no
such relationship with creditors. The administrative structure of the U.S.
system thus offers little impulse for a significant movement toward fea-
sible negotiated compromise plans.
Second, most French payment plans aim to retire 100% of creditors'
claims. This might be possible given the smaller average debt loads of
French consumers. But not only do U.S. consumers bear more debt, they
also bear greater expenses for such items as health care, child care, and
education. The few resources that French consumers are able to give up
in their payment plans are eaten away in the United States by expenses
not covered by government welfare programs. The reste-ai-vivre (budget
for debtor's living expenses) of U.S. plans would have to be considera-
bly greater than those in France. If 25% of French debtors have
absolutely no capacity to repay any of their debts, chances are that most
U.S. debtors would have no payment capacity, and few could pay any-
thing substantial. Consequently, U.S. creditors would have to give up all
or large portions of their claims to support a payment-plan system in the
United States. French practice has shown that creditors are loathe to ac-
cept this without significant outside pressure, and without a fundamental
restructuring, the U.S. system offers no source for such outside pressure.
Finally, focusing on substance rather than form, we must not forget
that vast numbers of French plans will ultimately end in failure. On the
one hand, forcing all debtors to negotiate and attempt to fulfill their obli-
gations might effectively change attitudes in the United States about
greater financial responsibility. On the other hand, thrusting debtors into
years of tight budgets and meager payments, only to allow most of them
to fail in the end, will only show most debtors that diligence is futile in
an age of declining wages, rising unemployment, and scores of low-
income consumers not covered by adequate health insurance. Decades of
practice in the United States have shown that consumer debtors are sel-
dom able to complete a payment plan, particularly a plan that extends
over many years. The benefit to creditors in these plans is largely illu-
sory, and setting up consumers to fail seems more a cruel game than an
effort at fostering responsibility.
Even if negotiated payment plans might not work in the United
States, courts certainly could impose payment plans on debtors and
creditors, as in the later stages of the French system. This might make
sense from the perspective of "individual responsibility for debtors," but
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the economic value to creditors of realistic, viable plans is likely to be
severely limited, given the economic and social conditions of most over-
extended U.S. consumer debtors. After reviewing the French and
German systems, I believe that payment plans in an overwhelming ma-
jority of cases can serve only a rhetorical or pedagogical purpose-a
very positive but limited goal. The German system accomplishes balance
by requiring a "payment" period in every case but offering real protec-
tion to a livable amount of income. The reality of consumer economics
virtually ensures that no German debtor will actually pay anything to
creditors, yet the system steadfastly reminds debtors of their obligations
and the dangers of the modem credit economy. So far, the French system
seems to be taking itself too seriously, as the U.S. system might do if
current "reform" proposals are adopted here. It is neither economically
nor pedagogically sound to demand that most debtors promise to make
payments that they are realistically unable to make. Both debtors and the
system suffer from the endless cycle of filing and refiling that overly
demanding plans produce. It has to end somewhere, and German law-
makers seem to have identified a much more meaningful end point.
At the end of the day, I remain convinced of the soundness of a sys-
tem that demands some form of moderate, realistic payment plan of
every debtor. But I am much less sanguine about the potential success of
such a system in the United States, particularly the system envisioned in
current proposals pending in Congress. Payment plans are fine as long as
they are realistic. Both the German and French systems have progressed
gradually from more to less demanding-and less to more realistic. But
while German plans seem to be quite realistic, at least the early French
plans did not, due in significant part to the wide discretion granted to the
commissions. If a payment-plan system were to be adopted in the United
States, I would hope that lawmakers would opt for a realistic, rational,
German-type approach, but current proposals seem to be oriented much
more along the lines of the stubbornly dogmatic, unrealistic French ap-
proach. The income of most U.S. consumers is already stretched to the
breaking point. For debtors already past the breaking point, overly de-
manding plans with insufficient income reserves would serve no
constructive purpose. Unfortunately, it appears as though an ill-
considered policy of "getting tough on debt" is as much in vogue in the
U.S. Congress as is the equally questionable policy of "getting tough on
crime."
Indeed, let us not forget that forcing plans on all debtors creates a
significant administrative burden and substantial extra expense. I believe
the educational benefits of a German-type plan system are worth the ex-
pense, so long as the costs are allocated sensibly and fairly. In Europe,
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the burden and expense of such systems fall on the state-under current
U.S. reform proposals, the added expense would fall mainly on debtors.
In my view, this simply adds insult to injury.
C. What's Good for the Goose ....
Responsibility for Lenders, Too
The rhetoric of financial responsibility tends to be very one-sided in
the United States, but the greatest lesson that France has to offer the
United States is that responsibility is a two-way street. While required
negotiations and the preeminence of payment plans in the French system
force debtors to take responsibility for their financial lives, other ele-
ments of the law explicitly call on lenders to bear their fair share of
responsibility. The Loi Neiertz not only instituted a system of consumer
debt relief, it also instituted a system of credit reporting.
3
1
7 One of the
explicit goals of the law was to make lenders more responsible in their
practices of extending credit to consumers . The credit reporting system
facilitates the achievement of this objective by making lenders bear their
share of responsibility for consumer over-indebtedness.
349
Lenders are effectively required to act responsibly by restricting
consumer credit in light of negative information in the new credit report-
ing system.5 The law directs that, in deciding which measures of relief
to recommend, "the commission shall take into account the knowledge
of the debtor's debt situation that each creditor might have had at the
time of execution of the different contracts."35' Furthermore, the law sug-
gests that the commission "may also verify that the contract was entered
into with the seriousness imposed by standards of professional prac-
tice."352 Thus, the law encourages the commissions to sanction lenders
who make foolish or unfounded loans, primarily those who extend credit
to already overextended debtors.353 I have found no commentary on the
347. See Law No. 89-1010, supra note 109, art. 23; C. CONSOMM. art. L.333-4 (2004).
The system reports only negative credit information, "payment incidents," rather than all in-
formation concerning a consumer's debt portfolio, as in the U.S. credit reporting system. See,
e.g., SERVICES RENDUS A LA COLLECTIVITE: LE FICHIER NATIONAL DES INCIDENTS DE REM-
BOURSEMENT DES CREDITS AUX PARTICULIERS, available at http://www.banquedefrance.fr/
banquejde-france/fr/info/collect/3.htm; DIRECTION DES MOYENS DE PAIEMENTS SCRIPTURAUX
ET DES SYSTAMES D' tCHANGE, BANQUE DE FRANCE, BULLETIN DE LA BANQUE DE FRANCE,
Sept. 1994, at 99, available at http://www.banquedefrance.fr/fr/telecharbulletin/etud
9 -3.pdf.
348. See Morin, supra note 28, at 129, 137, 140; HYEST & LORIDANT, supra note 25,
§ lI.C.2.
349. See Morin, supra note 28, at 129
350. See Marmoz, supra note 29, at 1402.
351. C. CONSOMM. art. L.331-7 (2004).
352. Id.
353. See, e.g., Marmoz, supra note 29, at 1402; cf. ZIEGEL, supra note 16, at 150-51
(discussing similar proposals in Canada).
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commissions' practice in this area-perhaps the Banque de France has
been unwilling to differentiate treatment among responsible and irre-
sponsible lenders. But at least French lawmakers acknowledged that
some lenders bear particular responsibility for consumer over-
indebtedness and ought equitably to be held accountable.
Not only does U.S. law contain no analogous rule of "creditor re-
sponsibility," the rules effectively shield creditors from any challenge to
their lending behavior. When a U.S. debtor's lawyer develops a Chapter
13 payment plan, U.S. bankruptcy law prohibits the plan from discrimi-
nating "unfairly" against any class of creditors.354 As far as I am aware,
no one has ever attempted to classify separately all "irresponsible claim-
ants" to be paid less than others. If this were ever attempted, though, I
doubt that any court would accept this separate classification as "fair."
One can easily imagine a great number of U.S. creditors who would
fall into such an "irresponsible" class in the United States. The list
would certainly begin with the "payday lenders" and other purveyors of
"high-cost credit," who lend to those whose credit histories make them
"unacceptable risks" for "main-stream" lenders.355 Payday lenders,
pawnshops, rent-to-own outlets, and home-equity "predatory" lenders
have reaped enormous and growing profits over the last two decades. 3 6 It
would make perfect sense to hold them accountable for the distress that
their "distressed lending" causes to consumers. Anyone who watches
cable television is all too familiar with buzz-lines like the following:
"Bad Credit? No Credit? Bankruptcy? No Problem!" These lenders
would also occupy a prominent position on the "irresponsible" list.
Would it not be perfectly equitable, as the French law suggests, to offer
such creditors vastly inferior treatment in a plan? Even among more
"main-stream" lenders, what about banks that issue credit cards to con-
sumers who have borrowed the limit on several other cards, or banks that
issue cards without verifying the employment or income reported, or
banks that issue multiple credit cards to college students with little or no
capacity to repay the charges?357 If card issuing banks maximize profits
by relying on credit scores and inflating late and over-limit fees,358 rather
than acting "responsibly" in checking a credit report and current em-
354. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1) (2004).
355. For excellent discussions of the development of this growing segment of the U.S.
credit market, see generally CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, TAMING THE SHARKS: TOWARDS A
CURE FOR THE HIGH-COST CREDIT MARKET (2004); ROBERT D. MANNING, CREDIT CARD
NATION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN'S ADDICTION TO CREDIT 121-23, 195-225
(2000).
356. See PETERSON, id., at 17, 21, 25, 35-36; MANNING, id., at 203-10.
357. For a discussion of these types of extremely common practices, see MANNING,
supra note 355, at 27, 94, 121,137-39, 159-93.
358. Id. at94, 121.
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ployment, should the system not take that into account when some con-
sumers are inevitably unable to pay?
It ought to give policymakers pause that lenders spend millions of
dollars to lobby Congress for reform of the consumer bankruptcy prob-
lem instead of simply acting more responsibly in their lending decisions.
Consumer bankruptcy losses ought to be viewed as a cost of trading
profits for responsibility. If the market demands profitability levels fu-
eled by credit scores and truncated review of credit applications, the
market must expect that a small percentage of borrowers will need relief
from financial overextension. If responsibility is to become the corner-
stone of U.S. consumer bankruptcy policy, perhaps policymakers should
follow the European lead in more aggressively taking account of the re-
sponsibility of the supply side as well as the demand side of the market.
The French system offers a final, simple lesson in taking a balanced ap-
proach to responsibility. Sometimes the simplest lessons are the most
important.
